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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
~~cord No, 2301 
CITY OF HAMPTON, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF 
THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Complainant, 
versus 
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF NORTH AMERICA, A 
FOREIGN CORPOR.ATION, Defendant. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL. 
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner, City of Hampton, a municipal corpora::-
tion of the State of Virginia, respectfully represents that it 
is a,ggrieved by a final decree of the Circuit Court of Eliza~ 
beth City County entered against it on the 10th day of No-
vember, 1939, in t1 ~uit wherein petitioner sought to require 
the defendant, Insurance Company of North America, a 
foreign corporation, to pay certain taxes theretofore as-
sessed against it by petitioner. 
THE CASE IN THE COURT BELOW. 
This suit was brought as a test of the validity of Chapter 
387 of the Acts of th~ General Assembly of Virginia of 1934 
and an ordinance of the City of Hampton, Virginia, which 
was p~ssed pursuaµt to the said shitute on the 25th day of 
April, 1935. The provisions of the statute will be found 
i:n Micbie's Code, 1936 Edition, as Sections :{144-t, 3144-u, 
3144-v and 3144-w. 
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The City of Hampton having duly assessed the tax provided 
by the ordinance and the defendant having ref used to pay it, 
this suit was brought to enforce the provisions of the statute 
and of the ordinance. 
Counsel for complainant and defendant entered into a 
stipulation of facts, in addition to any admissions in the 
pleadings available to the opposing party. 
The suit was heard upon the pleadings and the stipulation 
of facts. The trial court held that the statute and ordinance 
in. question are unconstitutional. A memorandum opinion 
was filed by the Court and a final decree embodying 
2* *the essential terms of the opinion was entered on the 
10th day of November, 1939, from which this appeal is 
sought. 
THE FACTS. 
The defendant is a stock fire insurance company, and is a 
foreign corporation duly authorized to engage in the busi-
ness of writing and issuing fire insurance policies in the 
State of Virginia for compensation. The tax involved in 
the suit amounts td $4.19 for the year 1936 and $22.11 for the 
year 1937. These taxes were assessed against the defendant 
by complainant upon premiums amounting to $418.68 · for 
the year 1936 and $2,211.26 for the year 1937, received by 
the defendant upon policies of fire insurance issued by it 
upon real and personal property within the City of Hamp-
ton during those years (M. R., p. 81). 
A portion of the real and personal property within the City 
of Hampton and subject to the risk of damage by fire is 
fully insured. A portion thereof is not fully insured under 
policies of fire insurance, that is, is insured for less than 
its full value. A portion of FiUC-h property is not insured 
at all against loss by fire. Some fire insurance carried on 
property witliin tl1e City of Hampton is carried- in com-
panies which are not admitted to do business in this State, 
have never qualified to do business in Virginia, and have 
made no reports of premiums ; and such companies are not 
reached by the tax imposed under the ordinance (M. R., p. 82). 
Cities' and towns in Virginia are classed in accordance with 
the application of certain grading schedules and petitioner, 
along with certain other cities in this State, is a city of the 
second class (M. R., p. 82). 
• A portion of the real and personal property within 
3* the City of Hampton and subject to the risk of damage 
by fire is insured in mntnal fire insurance companies 
City of Hampton, v. Insurance Co. of N ortb_ America. 3 
and a portion is insured under reciprocal and inter-insur-
ance contracts (M. R., p. 82). 
Under Section 237 of the tax Code of Virginia, non-admitted 
insurance companies, although there are such which write the 
classes of insurance specified in that Section, do not pay the 
tax for which that s·ection provides (M. R., p. 82). . 
The City of Hampton -has at all times since the passage 
of the ordinance in question in this suit, had a fire depart-
ment in which were employed three full time paid firemen, 
namely, an engineer and first and second engineers, and it 
has had also seventy (70) volunteer firemen, composing a 
fire company organized under Chapter 125 of the Qode of 
Virginia: {M. R., p. 82). 
All things required by the ordinance in question _ to be 
done by the City of Hampton, its fire department and others, 
to administer said ordinance and to make the sarpe effective, 
had been complied with (M. R., pp. 82, 83). 
At the time this suit was filed and when the tax for which 
it was brought arise, and the premiums upon which the tax 
was assessed were received by the defendant, it was en-
gaged in the business of issuing policies of fire insurance, 
and it did issue such polici~s upon real and personal ,prop-
erty in the City of Hampton, for compensation generally 
known as a premium. The premiums were paid by the as-
sured under each such fire insurance policy to the defend-
ant, during the years set forth above, and these acts were with-
in the purview and scope of the ordinance in question (M. R., 
p. 67). 
•The ordinance in question in this suit was passed by 
4• the Council of the City of Hampton on April 25, 193f;, 
and became effective on that date. It was passed pur-
suant to the authority of Chapter 387 of the Acts of the 
General Assembly of ,Virginia of 1934 CM. R., p. 67). 
Defendant has refused to pay the tax aforesaid and con-
tends that claimant has no legal authority to collect it be-
cause the ordinance and aet in qnestio11 are both uncon-
stitutional (M. R., p. 68). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
There are two assignments of error in this suit: 
(1) The Court below erred in decreeing that the ordinance 
and statute in question were unconstitutional and unenforce-
able. 
(2) The Trial Court erred in holding that when the Gen-
~t:J.preme Court of ~ppe~Is of Virgini~ 
eral ~ssembly enact~d Section 3034 of the Code it exhausted 
its power to authorize municipalities to provide for the re-
Jief of firemen and their dependents~ 
~~G~L QUESTIONS PRESENTED~ 
I. Are the statuJes and the ordina1Jice in qitestion a valid 
~ · ~ul constit~itional exercise of legislative power by the 
Ge·neral Assembly 01nd by the Co1i~cil of the City of 
Hampton'/ 
II. 1$ Section 1BB of the Constitution of Virginia violated by 
· the statutes !l!nd the ordinance? 
HI~ Is there any constitu,tional prohibition against the desig-
nation of a tax for a particitlar purpose? 
IV~ Do the ordina1ice or statutes in qitesti01i violate Section 
1 of Article XIV of the Amendments of the Constitittion 
of the Un,ited States, a111,d 8eotion 11 of the Constitution 
of Virginia? 
*V. The burden is always upon hi1n who asserts it to $" establish that a statute is ,z1,nconstitutional. 
VI. Do the statutes in q11,estion exempt certain insurance 
comp<111iies fro1n payment of the tax thereby authorized? 
VI~~ Does Section 3034 of the Code of Virginia exhaust the 
po'l:(Jer of municipalities, to provide for the 'relief of fire-
_r,nen and their dependents? 
ARGUMENT. 
1. .A re the statutes and the ordinooae in q11,estion a valid 
and constitutional cxerc-i.<:e of le(fisla.tive po-wer b~1 tht! 
General Assem.blJJ a.nd b11 the Oouncil of the Gity of 
Hampton'! . 
For many years firemen of this State have felt that be-
cause of the unusually hazardous nature of their public serv-
ice, provision should be made for their relief in the event 
they suffer injuries in the line of their duties and for the re-
lief of their dependents should they be killed. Firemen oc-
cupy a peculiar position in the public service. They a.re as 
cerfainly engaged in the defense of the lives and property 
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of the citizens as are the military branches of the govern-
ment. Their duties require courage, loyalty, obedience and 
an unwavering acceptance of the most dangerous assign-
ments. 
The complete, aggressive and capable performance of their 
duties by firemen is a subject in which the general public has 
a direct interest because it involves protection of their lives 
and property. This is a public function which governments 
are required to clischarg·e. And it is one which directly 
benefits fire insurance companies because it reduces their 
losses by fire. That the efficiency of :firemen is bound to be 
increased by the knowledge that they will receive :financial 
benefits if they are injured in tl10 line of duty and that their 
*dependents will be given financial assistance should they 
641i be killed, cannot be denied. 
Because statutes previously passed for this purpose 
were declared unconstitutional, Chapters 387 and 388 of the 
Acts of 1934, pages 817 to 820, inclusive, were enacted and 
~pproved March 30, 1934. They were intended to meet the 
legal and constitutional defects which the courts found in 
the previous statutes, and we believe they do so. 
A. The statute (J,lfld the ordi1iance. 
The ordinance in paragraph 1 thereof imposes a tax upon 
'' each and every person, partnership, company or corpora-
tion which contracts on his, their, or its account, to issue 
policies or contracts for, or agreements for fire insurance, 
*.'"' * ". The tax is in addition to such other taxes as may be 
paid by them and is '' $1.00 on each $100.00 of gross premiums, 
except reinsurance premiums, collected and received by them, 
less returned premiums, from fire insurance policies covering 
property situated within the limits of this city during the 
preceding calendar year". 
Both with respect to who is taxed and the meth9d or means 
of gauging said tax, the language of the ordinance and of 
Section 3144-t are identical. Said Section provides that the 
council or other goveming body of cities and towns which 
have fire companies is authorized to impose on '' every per-
son, partnership, con1pany or corporation which contracts 
on his, their or its account, to issue policies or contracts for 
or a~reements for fire insurance'' an annual tax of '' One 
($1.00) Dollar on each One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars of 
gross premiums, except reinsurance premiums, collected and 
received, less returned premiums". 
7* •1t is true that Section 3144-u of the Code provides 
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- that the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking of the 
State of Virginia shall, upon request of the city, furnish 
it with the name of eaeh insurer which has within the pre-
ceding year "received premiums from fire insurance policies 
covering property situated within the limits of such city or 
incorporated town and the amount of such gross premiums, 
less returned premiums received''. Because this Section does 
not by express language except from the report which the 
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking is required to make 
reinsurance premiums, as is provided in Section 3144-t, coun-
sel for defendant contended in the Court below that the infor-
. mation furnished by the Commissioner of Insurance and 
Banking did not permit the Commissioner of Revenue of 
Hampton to assess the tax in the manner and upon the basis 
which Section I of the ordinance specifies. However, irre-
spective of Section 3144-u of the Code, paragraph nuinbered 
2 of the ordinance prescribes that the Commissioner of Reve-
nue shall request the Commissioner of Insurance and Bank-
ing to "furnish this city the name of each insurer which 
has within the preceding calendar year received premiums 
from fire insurance policies covering property situated with-
in the limits of this city and the amount of su,ch gross 
premiums, except reinsitrance premiums, collected and re-
ceived by them, less returned premimns". So, that the Com--
missioner of Revenue of the City of Hampton was directed 
to request from the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking 
the amount of premiums, said amount being described in 
the exact language of the taxing paragraph in the ordinance 
(paragraph 1) and the enabling Section of the Code ( Section 
3144-t). 
Furthermore, in order that the Commissioner of Insurance 
and Banking might have authority to require fire insurance 
companies to furnish said Commissioner with the information 
on which to basff the tax under s·ection 3144-t, the General 
Assembly of Virginia; simultaneously with the passage of said 
Section, *also <-macted Section 4R14(l8) of the Code 
8* (Chapt. R88 of the Act.R of the General A8sembly of 1934, 
pag·e 819). Tlie latter Section provides that eve;·v fire in-
surel' ~lrn 1l ll POU demand of the CommiBsioner of Insurance 
and Ranking retnrn to the Raid CommisRioncr a just and true 
account of" all gross premiums! P.X,N!pt reinsnranr.P- pre-mi!ltm,c;_. 
collected and received. lesR returrn~d r,reminms, from the fire 
insurance policies ,l[< * *.'' coverin!r prope1·ty situated within 
each r.ity. town and connty. Th0re is no other leg·islatiy·e pro-
vision authorizing the Commissioner of Insurance and Rank-
in~ to 1·equire information of tMs nat11re of fire insurer, and 
such information as is furnished said. Commissioner must 
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necessarily be '' gross premiums, excevt reinsitrance pre ... 
miums, collected and received, Jess returned premiums". 
It was stipulated as a part of the agreed £acts in this case 
that all things, which are required by the ordinance to be 
done by the City of Hampton, its .:fire department and others, 
to administer said ordinance and to make the same effective, 
have been complied with. The amount of premium taxes 
.and the amount of the taxi~ this cause are thereby admitted 
to be correct. We do not understand that the defendant con-
tends that the tax with which it ha.s been assessed in this case· 
is upon any. different basis from that stipulated in Section 
3144-t of the Code. There is no law prohibiting the Com-
missioner of Insurance and Banking from furnishing the Com-
missioner of Revenue of the City of Hampton information 
which the said Commissioner of Revenue requests under 
paragraph 2 of said ordinance and which the Commissioner 
of Insurance and Banking ha.s obtained under authority of 
Section 4314(18) of the- Code. The Commissioner of Reve-
nue, of the City of Hampto:n, in so re~eiving the information 
in this case and in assessing 'the taxes thereon, complied with 
Section 3144-t of the Code and paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
ordinance, and in furnishing -the information to said Com-
missioner • of Revenue, the Commissioner of Insurance 
9* and Banking· complied with Section 4314(18) .of the Code, 
· by each of which tlie premiums on which the tax is based 
arc defined as '' gross premiums, except reinsurance premiums, 
collected and received, less returned premiums''. 
·while it is plain that the tax in this case has been based 
upon the correct information and that the contention of the 
defendant made in the Court below was without merit, we 
nevertheless point out that if the tax had been assessed upon 
a basis other than provided for by the statute, the taxpayer's 
redress would have been to petition the proper court for a 
rebate or other appropriate relief for so much of the tax as 
is found to be improperly assessed. 
The further point was made in the Court below by the de-
fendant that it is not alleged in the bill that the City of Hamp-
ton has had a fire company or .:fire companies organized under 
the provisions of Chapter 125 of the Code of Virginia. This is 
clearly covered by the 7th paragraph of the stipulation of 
counsel and is, the ref ore, an admitted fact and cannot be 
questioned by the defendant. . . 
It was further contended in the Court below by the def end-
ant that the Sections of the Code.l1ereinbefore referred to pre-
scribe the steps necessary for the proper levy of the tax and 
that the bill does not allege that the defendant has takell 
Sup~eme Court of A ppcals of' Virginia 
thei;;~ steps. The ordinance is made a part of' the bill by 
speciffo-- reference in paragraph numbered 4 thereof. The 
bill alleges that the tax has been assessed pursuant to the 
·said ordinance for the purposes therein set forth and that the· 
tax '' is now due and owing from the said defendant pursuant 
to the provisions of said ordinance''. · 
•In paragraph numbered 8 of the bill it is alleged that 
10• "aII provisions of said ordinance * * • have been com-
plied with by the said city and by the members of the fire 
department• • " and that the defendant had proper notice of 
the assessment of said taxes against it". In the 8th para-
graph of the stipulation of ·counsel, and which paragraph 
is hereinbef ere quoted,. it is agreed that all things which are 
required by the city to be done to make the ordinance effec-
tive have been done. T11e steps necessary to be taken are set 
forth in the ordinance and in the Act and the stipulation of 
counsel states tllat tliese things have been done. Thereforer 
we respectfully submit tliat the contention of the defendant 
that the necessary steps have riot been shown to have been 
taken as a prerequisite to the levy, is without merit. 
B. Whether the use to be made of these funds be for a chari-
table purpose, or be added compensation or an emolit-
ment of public office, they are- within the power of the 
municipality. 
In the case of Comnwnwealth v. National Fire Ins. Co. of 
Hartford, 161 Va. 737, 172 S. E. 448, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia held that a statute imposing a State 
tax for purposes similar to those defined in the ordinance 
now before the Court, was an unconstitutional appropriation 
of public funds contrary to the express provisions of Sections 
67 and 188 of the Constitution of ,Virginia, because the funds 
were to be used for a charitable purpose. 
Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia prohibits the Gen-
eral Assembly of Virginia from appropriating public funds 
for certain uses therein set out, but the final clause of that 
Section is: 
'' nothing herein contained· s·hall prohibit the General 
.Assembly from authorizing counties, cities or towns to make 
such appropriations to any charitable institution or associa-
tion.'' 
*Since our State Constitution is not a delegation of 
11 * powers, but only the restriction of powers otherwise 
practically unlimited (Strawberry Hill, &c., v. Starbiick, 
City of Hampton, v. Insnra.nce Co. of North America. 9 
124 Va. 71, 77), the General Assembly had the power to confer 
the authority upon localities which is contained in Chapter 
387 of the Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of 1934 
even without the quoted clause of Section 67 of the Constitu-
tion. Therefore, the placing of that clause in the Constitu-
tion plainly shows, we think that the drafters of that Section 
and the people in adopting it intended to impressively em-
phasize the fact that the General Assembly retained the power 
to grant such authority to the localities. 
C. The levy is a tax. 
We do not believe there can be any doubt that the levy 
authorized by the ordinance here in question is a tax. It 
is called a tax in the Act (Section 3144-t), and in the ordi-
nance itself. 
In Corn,rn,onwealth v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 161 
Va. 737, 172 S. E. 448, a levy to be imposed by the State, 
and which in all substantial respects was identical with that 
authorized to be imposed and which is in fact imposed by 
the ordinance 110w before this Court, w·as held unconsti-
tutional by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia because 
it violated Sections 67 and 188 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
In that case the Court, in discussing the question as to whether 
the funds to be derived by the levy, were public funds and 
whether the levy was in fact a tax, said (172 S. E. 450): 
12* *'' The :first question that is suggested is this: Are 
the funds assessed and collected, under the terms of the 
act, public funds? If the assessment is a. tax by governmental 
power, and the funds realized and collected thereunder repre-
sent the aggreg·ate or a part of the tax assessed, then as-
suredly it is a public fund. A fund created by such a tax can 
be none other than a public one. Is the assessment pro-
vided for by the act a tax? The title of the act is, in part, 
in these words: ' * * • To levy a tax upori the premiums 
collected,' etc. Section 2 of the act provides that the insur-
ance companies assessed thereunder shall pay to the treasurer 
of Virginia so much money, 'in addition to such other taxes'. 
The terms of an act are certainlv to be considered as reflective 
of its real character, the purposes to be accomplished by it, 
and its meaning. In the act in question the assessment is 
designated as a tax, and the subsequent collection and dis-
posal of the fund, in some striking particulars, are very like 
those incident to the treatment and disposition of tax funds. 
We think there can be no serious doubt about the funds, pro-
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vided by the assessment and collection features of the act, 
being public funds.'' 
D. The funds derived by the municipality under the ordinance 
are public funds. 
The contention was made in the Court below by counsel for 
the defendant that the funds which are raised by the ordinance 
are not public funds. Again, we refer to the case of Com-
monwealth v. Nationa,l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, supra, here-
inabove cited, and the quotation froq1 the opinion in that case, 
which appears in the preceding section of this brief. Because 
the Act b~fore the Court in that suit sought to impose a tax 
by the State in almost identically the same manner as that 
which is imposed by the ordinance now before this Court for 
purposes and uses practically identical with those expressed 
in the ordinance, the language of that decision is most perti-
nent in support of the contention that the funds received 
by the municipality under the ordinance are public funds. 
Their designation by the Act and by the ordinance as funds 
to be held separately by the treasurer under the classification 
of ''Firemen's Relief Fund'' •does not destroy their 
13* character as public funds. It is not unusual, but is cus-
tomary, for funds which are derived through tax levies 
to be allocated for special public uses. The segregation of 
funds for special governmental or public purposes is notably 
illustrated in the provisions customarily made for the cre-
ation of sinking funds to retire bonds issued for specific pur-
poses, such as the construction of public. schools. 
Provision is also made in the statutes of Virginia for a 
tax to be used for the support of the Board of Motion Pic-
ture Censors of Virginia ( See Code, Sections 378-d and 378-e). 
-Special levies are made upon insurance. companies for the 
support of the Bureau of Insurance (Section 4195). 
Special levies are made upon banks for the support of the 
hanking bnreai1 nnd the examination of banks (Sections 
4149(56) and 4149(56a). 
None of these levies can be said not to be public funds. 
They are used for public purposes and while they are levied 
upon a particular class of taxpayers who are peculiarly af-
fected by the activities of the particular governmental agency, 
for the support of which such funds are created; and the 
funds thus raised are held separately from all other public 
levies, they are used for purposes in which the public at 
large is interested and under supervision and control of the 
State government. They are, therefore, public funds. 
--
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Such is the case with the funds raised and to be raised by 
the ordinance now before this Court. · 
14 ~ * E. There i'> an appropriation o.f the funds. 
The protection of the city from fire is a municipal function 
of the l1ighest importance.. The maintenance of '' a judiciously 
administered pension fund is doubtless a potent agency in 
.securing the services of the most faithful and efficient class 
of men". Comm·onwealth v. Barlcer, 211 Pa. 610, 61 Atl. 
263. 
The maintenance of an efficient nre department is a public 
duty of the city and one in which all the people are vitally in-
terested. 
The contention in the Court below of counsel for the de-
fendant that the ordinance makes no appropriation of the 
funds raised by the tax is not tenable. The ordinance does 
in fact appropriate the funds to be paid upon the warrant of 
the trustees provided therein to be elected by the firemen. 
The funds wbich have Leen created by the levy under the or-
dinance are by the ordinance, as by the statute which au-
thorized the ordinance, designated and set apart as a '' Fire-
men's R.elief Fund". These funds are thus appropriated. 
by the ordinance to be used for that purpose alone. This 
was held to he true in Commonwealth v. National Fire bis. 
Co. of Hartford, s·itpra., whe-re the Court said (172 S. E. 
451): 
"The inm:;capable conclusion, in our view, is that the Act 
provides for and carries an appropriation within the mean-
ing- of the Section of the Constitution with which we are 
dealing." 
The Section then under consideration was Section 67 of 
tl1e Constitution. 
The disbursement of the funds thus appropriated is upon 
warrants of thP. trustees and there is no substantial difference 
between this method of disbursement than would be the case 
if the budget of the city carried an item of funds for that 
purpose designated under that heading to be disbursed. 
15* by tl1e trustee~ ~from time to time during the current 
fiscal vear. There is no difference in effect between this 
method of ·handling these funds tl1an that employed in the 
disbursement of other funds which are appropriated by a 
budget ordinance, allocating to a department of the munici-
pality a. definite sum of money for its maintenance and op-
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e.ratiori dnring the current fiscal year, such funds to be dis-
bursed upon warrants or vouchers of those officers of the 
department for which the funds are appropriated, who are 
authorized to issue such instruments for normal maintenance 
and operating expenses. 
There is no substantial difference between this method and 
that employed in appropriating a blanket sum to a depart-
ment for payroll expenses to be disbursed in such amounts 
as may be agreed upon between the persons employed and 
the heads of the department for the specific clerical and other-
tasks for which they are engaged. The hiring and firing of 
such employees and the authorization of the payment of 
specific sums to them are entirely beyond any legal or prac-
tical requirements of the governing body of a municipality. 
No constitutional or legal mandate prohibits the method 
of disbursement and appropriation of the funds which a.re 
here provided for. The activities of the trustees are judicial 
and ministerial in that they must hear claims and allow or 
disallow them. When thcv allow claims thev issue the neces-
sary instruments to apportion the funds among the claimants 
in such amounts as their awards specify. The funds they 
thus disburse are those which the ordinance has appropriated 
to their nse. 
16* *It would be impossible for tlle council to hear and 
judicially determine the claims made. It would be 
burdensome for the council to make separate appropriations 
for each claim. al1owed. Such requirements would make the 
work of the council in a large city impossible of performance. 
The appropriation of such funds by the council for the pay-
ment of individual claims of firemen or their beneficiaries, 
and the review of the action of the trustees by the council 
would remove the safeguards which protect the administra-
tion and use of these funds which are set up in the existing 
· ordinance. Pressure ,vould necessarily be brought upon 
elected members of t11e council and unbiased, impadial and 
disinterested consideration and adjudication of such claims 
would be jeopardized. The ordinance sets up a method of 
distribution of the funds which frees tl,em from political con-
siderations as well as from considerations of sympathy, bias 
or prejudice which obviously Rhould play no part in the ad-
ministration of such funds. 
The appropriation of the funds by the council to the trus-
tees for distribution in Accordance with their judgment is in 
conformity with that part of the statute which states that 
the funds ''may he held. controllP.d and appropriated aR au-
-thorized aTici directed by tl1e councilR or boards of superyisors 
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of the localities". Council can~ of course, at any time with-
draw its appropriation of these funds to the trustees by any 
change in the ordinance which the council may from time to 
time deem necessary or proper to protect the funds or the 
beneficiaries thereof. 
There is no substantial difference between placing the funds 
derived from this tax in an earmarked account designated 
"Firemen's Reljef Fund" at the outset and so holding them 
for that purpose than would be the case if the· funds 
·17* •went into the general account of the municipality and 
thereafter were appropriated out of that account to a 
fund to be desig11ated, 7' Firemen's Relief Fund''. 
F. If the use for iiJhich these funds are to be devoted i.q not· 
a charitable one, then the f'u.nds are mi additional vart: 
of the compensation or emoluments of of flee of the fire-
men of the city. 
There is no substantial distinction between paying firomeu 
an increased sum per month and deducting that sum for a 
firemen's relief fund or instead of paying them such iu. 
creased sum, to set a part such sum as a firemen's relief fund 
from which they will derive the same benefits as would ac-
crue to them from the payment by them of S!lch amounts out 
of their salaries to create the fund. In either event, the pur-
pose of the fund thus set aside is to establish a beneficial 
fund for the maintenance and support of the injured firemen 
and the beneficiaries of those killed in the line of dutv. 
It was held in Thompson v. 11! wmphis~ 251 S. W. 46, that the 
action of a city in taking out group insurance for its employees 
in its water department was not unconstitutional as an ap-
propriation of public funds for private purposes. The Court 
said: 
"Upon tl1e principle liere involved-tlrnt is, of better ancl 
continued service, and more wholesome water-various courts 
have sustained statutes requiring cities to pension firemen 
nnd policemen. Such an act was sustained in State ex rel 
Haberlan v. Love. 89 Nebr. 149, 131 N. W. 196, the court say-
ing: 'A fireman's pension may be classified as part of his 
compensation for servie.es rendered or it may be said that 
it is paid to him fol' the purpos~ of stimulating· all those en-
gaged in a like public duty to prevent :-mcl suppress the de-
struction of property and the lose:; of human life incident to 
those conflagratiorn.:; which the utmost vhdlance may mini-
mize. but e::innot entirely prevent, in populous cities. Within 
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whichever class the pension may fall, public funds mav be 
appropriated in conformity with legislative authority or to 
pay the fireman, and the money is thereby eA"J)ended for a 
_public- purpose." 
18* e, 'Furtll~r on in the opinion the court sa.id : 
" 'In applying· these limitations to the instant case, it may 
'be conceded that the pension forms an inducement to the in-
dividual to enter and remain in the service of the fire depart-
ment, and that the pension in a sense is part of the compen-
sation paid for those services.' " 
In Phoen-ix Ass'urancc Co. v. Fire Depart11ient of the City 
of Montgomery, 117 Ala. 631, 23 Sou. 843, 42 L. R. A. 468, this 
case was a suit by the fire department to recover a penalty 
of $1,000.00 because the insurance company, without paying 
to the fire department the sum of $200.00, opened an office in 
the City of Montgomery, received premiums and took risks 
against losses by fire. The Court said: 
'' The tax is imposed on all fire insurance companies, 
'Yhether foreign or dolI!_estic, and in this respect is unlike 
the New York, Illinois, and ,visconsin statutes, which were 
limited to foreign companies. ThP. appellee is a foreig·n, not 
a domestic, company; and as to it, the statute may be re-
garded, as it was regarded by the New York and Wisconsin 
courts, as prescribing· a condition upon which lawfully it could 
do business within the designated locality. It is more in ac-
cordance with our Constitution and our theories of constitu-
tional construction to regard it as it wns intended by the leg-
islature,-as a tax, and not as a a police regulation; and, as 
such, it wi1~ regarded by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in 
Firemen's Bene-i\ .Asso. v. Lownsbitry, 21 Ill. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 
155. It is not infrequent that statutes have for t]1eir objects 
the raising of revenue and the police of the state, and blend-
ing them is not offensive to the Constitution. Battle v. Mo 
bile, 9 Ala. 234, 44 Am. Dec. 438; Yown_qblood v. Sexton, 32 
Mich. 406, 20 Am. Rep. 654.'' 
If the fund thus created is compensation or an emolument 
of office, it is an obligation of the municipality which re-
quireft no statutory or constitutional sanction. However, the 
power of a municipality to tax is one that can only be exer-
cised bv authority of the State. Therefore, it is plain that 
when tl1e General .A.ssemMy passed the Act. in question, it 
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was conferring the power upon municipalities to tax insur-
:ance companies in order to obtain the public funds necessary 
to establish the "Firemen's Relief Fund" for the specific pur .. 
_poses set forth in the statute. 
19• ,.,,.II. Is Section 7fj8 of the Con.c~tif'ldion of Virginia 
1;iolated bu the statittes and the ordinance1 
The defendant contends that the Act and the ordinance 
-contravene Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia, whic.h 
provides in part thatall taxes, whether State, local or munici- · 
pal, shall be uniform npon the same class of subjects within 
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and shall 
be levied and collected under general law. 
Section 168 is as follows : 
'' All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 
taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be 
uniform upon the same. class of subjects within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying· the tax, and shall be levied and 
collected under general law. The general assembly may de-
-fine and classify taxable subjects, and, except as to classes of 
property herein expressly segregated for either State or local 
taxation, the general assembly may segregate the several 
classes of property so as to specify and determine upon what 
subjects State ta..""\:es, and upon what subjects local taxes may 
be levied.'' 
.A.. The tax in question is a license tax and not subject to the 
provisions of SectiO'Ji 168 of the Constitution. 
The distinction which counsel for the defendant has sought 
to draw between the license tax and other forms of taxation 
is not tenable. A license tax is unif ormlv held under the de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and is 
admitted by counsel for the defendant, not to be within the 
scope of Section 168 of tlle Constitution of Virginia. .This 
is not becaitse it is a license tax but becaw;e a license taa; ·is 
an indirect tax. A license tax is merely a branch of that large 
body of indirect taxes whicl1 are not required to conform with 
the provisions of Section 168 of the Constitution. Among 
such taxes are income taxes, inheritance taxes, and many other 
forms of indirect taxation. 
20• _ *In general, taxes are classified as being either direct 
or indirect. 61 C. J ., Section 5, page 73. This is a.11 
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excise tax. H'ltnton v. CominonwealthJ 166 Va. 229, 183 S. E. 
873, and therefore, an indirect tax. 
The case of Hmiton v. Comnionwealth, supra, is a most in-
structive one with respect to the question of the distinction 
between direct and indirect taxes. In that case, the questioa 
specifically answered by the Court was whether the tax was 
a direct tax upon shares of stock and hence a direct tax on 
property itself, or a tax on the income derived from such 
property and hence an indirect tax. After stating the well-
kpown doctrine tl1at: '' Every reasonable doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the constitutionalitv of an act of the 
Legislature. Bou.rne v. Board of Supervisors, 161 Va. 678,. 
685, 172 S. E. 245; Carvel v. City of Richmond, 162 Va. 833,. 
840, 175 S. E. 316, '' the Conrt ~aid: 
"In any event, we think it may be safely said that the great 
weight of authority is contrary to the view that a tax on 
income derived from property is a tax on that property it-
self. An income tax is now generally accepted to be an 
excise tax.'' 
Another striking point was made in the opinion in the Hitn-
ton Case as support for the opinion that the t.ax there before 
the Court was not a direct tax on property. The Court said 
that a reading of the income tax statute showed that: 
"The tax is not levied on property but on the 'individual 
* * =» upon and with respect to his entire net income * "' *.' It 
is levied. on the taxpayer in proportion to bis net income, not 
in proportion to Jiis property." 
This is true also of the tax now before tl1is Court. The 
tax is not upon the prdperty but fa, as wa.s tbe case in the in-
come tax statute before the Court in the Hunton Case, a tax 
upon '' each and every person, partnership, company or cor-
poration'' which writes fire insurance as provided in the ordi-
nance. 
21.., *The Court further said in the Hmito'l1, Case (183 S. 
E. R79): 
"And so we think, in the final analysis, that the income tax 
here under review is rm excise tax ancl not a tax on the prop-
erty .from wllich it jg derived. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. So'll,fn-
ern R. Co .. 149 Va. 701. 706. 141 S. E. 770; Com,. v. Hannaford,. 
159 Va. 84, 88, 165 S. E. 512; Black on Income and Otllc.~r Fed-
eral Taxes (4th Eel.) Sec. 2; 26 R.. C. L., p. 142, Sec. 116. 
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'' Section 168 of the Constitution provides that 'all taxes 
• • * shall be uniform.' In Bradley c.l5 Co. v. Richnioml, 110 
Va. 521, 525, 66 S. E. 872, 87 4, we said : 'The provisions in 
the Const.itution requiring· equality and uniformity of taxa-
tion apply only to a direct tax on property, and not to lice11se 
taxes, which do not admit of a. tax strictly equal and uniform 
in the sense contended for. Helfrick's Case, 29 Grat. (70 Va.) 
844. When sections ms and 170 of the Constitution are read 
together, it is clear that it was not intended to include a li-
cense tax upon a business in any of the provisions speaking 
of taxes on property.' 
"This principle was reaffirmed by us in Cmn. v. Bibee 
Grocery Co., 153 Va. 935, 938, 151 S. E. 293, in which Chief 
,Justice Campbell spoke for the court. 
'' If. construing sections 168 and 170 together, we said that 
'a.11 taxes' meant 'all dfrect taxes on- property' to the exclu-
sion of license taxes, then it is equally true that 'all other 
taxes' in section 177 can likewise be construed to mean 'all 
other direct taxes on property' to the exclusion of income 
taxes.'' 
In Bradlet/ v. Rfohmond. 110 Va. 521, 525, the Supreme 
Court of Ap .. peals said: , 
'' The provisions in thi~ Constitution requiring equality 
and uniformity of taxation apply only to a. direct tax 011 
property, and not to license taxes, which do not admit of a 
tax strictly equal and uniform in the sense contended for. 
When Sections 16R and 170 of the Constitution are read to-
gether, it is clear that it was not intended to include a license 
tax upon a business in any of the provisions ~peaking of 
taxes on property.'' 
In Commonwealth v. Carter, 126 Va. 469, and in Cornett's 
Ex'or. v. Connnonwealth, 127 Va. 640, the Supreme 
22* Court of Appeals held that an inlieritance «tax is not a 
tax upon the property transferred from the estate of 
the decedent to the beneficiary but a privilege ta.x despite the 
fact that it affects the property transferred. 
In Poca1iontas Consolidated Co. v. Connnomvealth. 113 Va. 
108, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a tax on t.be 
recordation of a deed is not a tax on property, but a tax on 
the civil privilege of being allowed to avail oneself of the 
benefits and advantages of the registry laws of tl1e State. 
In the instant case the tax is upon gross premiums as de-
fined in the statute and in the ordinance and it is not, there-
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fore, a tax upon the property of the companies involved, but 
a tax similar in nature to an income tax, which is measured 
in amount by the gross premiums or, as it might be other-
wise expressed, the gross income of the fire insurance com-
panies. _ 
The fact that the ta.x may at times bear heavily upon some 
member of a class will not invalidate it. C01nmonwealth v .. 
Whiting Oil Co., 167 Va. 73, 187 S. E. 498, 500. 
'' Some injustice is bound to result from any general rule 
of classification, and equal protection demands only reason-
able uniformity in dealing with parties similarly circum-
stanced.'' 
Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 55 S. Ct. 525, 
531. 
Accurate and complete equality and uniformity in taxation, 
while desirable, are impossible. Norfolk v. Snyder, 161 Va. 
288, 170 S. E. 721 (State Railroad Tax Cases, 9'2 U. S. 575, 
23 L. Ed. 663): 
23* *' '·Moreover, Section 168 of our Constitution requir-
ing equality and uniformity of taxation, in theory, ap-
plies only to a direct tax ou property and not to license taxes. 
Commonwealth v. Bibee Grocery Co., 153 Va. 935, 151 S. E. 
293. 
"Classification for the purposes of taxation is a lawful 
d.evice, commonly resorted to, is at times necessary, and must 
be sustained if it rests upon any reasonable basis. 
"One who assails the classification in snch a law must carry 
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any rea-
sonable basis but is essentially arbitrary.'' 
Commonwealth v. T-T'hitin,q Oil Co.; 167 Va. -73, 187 S. E. 
498, fiOO; Bnd cases cited tl1ereh1. 
The requirement of Section 168 of the Virginia Constitu-
tion is that taxes shall be uniform upon the same ''class of 
subjects'' within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing· the tax. The Legislature by the Act in question lias made 
that class such fl.re and lightning· insurance companies as do 
business in cities, towns and counties whieh have fire COil,l-
panies or fire departments and wherever that subject or class 
is found within the territorial limits of the State, the tax is 
imposed. 
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When the authority levying the tax, whether it be State, 
local or municipal, meets this requirement, the relief for those 
who feel unjustly burdened is not to the courts, but to the 
justness and fairness of the representatives composing the 
body which levied the tax. 
And as tltls Court stated in Brad"tey v. Richmond, 110 Va.. 
521, 525, where a license tax on private bankers was upheld: 
''The power of taxation, under our system of government, 
rests with the legislative and not with the judicial department, 
and its province cannot be invaded by the courts. Where the 
power to tax for revenue, purposes exists, the amount of the 
tax is in the discretion of the legislative body, and it may be 
carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State 
24* or corporation which *imposes it which the will of such 
State or corporation may prescribe. If the power is · 
exercised in any unwise, unjust and oppressive manner to 
any particular class, the remedy, within constitutional bounds, 
i:s by an appeal, not to tl1e courts, but to the justice and 
patriotism of the representatives of the people.'' Ould, etc. 
v. Rich·mond, supra; Commonwealth v. Moore, s1uprai Norfolk 
v. Norfolk Landnwrlc, supra; Wooda,ll v. Lynchburg, 100 Va. 
318, 40 S. E. 915. 
Section 168 of the Virginia Constitution requiring equality 
and uniformity of taxation applies only to a direct tax on 
µroperty and not sueh a tax: as is imposed by the act in ques-
tion which is in the nature of a. license tax for the privilege 
of doing business. 
As stated in Bradley v. Richmond, supra 
'' The provisions in the Constitution requiring equality and 
uniformity of taxation apply only to a direct tax on property,. 
and not to license taxes, which do not admit a tax strictly 
equal and uniform in the sense contended for. Helfrick's 
Case, 29 Gratt. 844. ·when sections 168 and 170 of the Con-
.stitution are read together it is clear that it was not intended 
to include a license tax upon a busine~s in any of the provi-
sions speaking of taxes on property. It was competent for the 
council to assig11 private bankers to different classes, and the 
plaintiff in error was required to pav no greater license tax 
than all others in the same class with himself. In order t.o 
render the classification illegal, the party assailing it must 
show that the business discriminated against is precisely the 
same as that included in the class which is alle2"ed to be 
favored. Norfolk, etc .. , v. Norfolk, 105 Va. 139, 52 ·s. E. 851, 
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This has not been shown in the present case. On the con-
trary, it appears that the business of the plaintiff in error is 
not precisely th~ same with that of other private bankers 
who are put in a different class and assessed with a less li-
cense tax.'' 
In Pocah01itas Co. v. Commowwealth? 113 Va.108, the Court 
held valid a tax on deeds of trust of internal improvement 
companies measured by mileage in this State when others 
were taxed regardless of property in this State, saying (p. 
112): 
25* ,.,,In the first place, this is not a tax upon property, 
either within or out of the State, but a tax upon a civil 
privilege, that is, for the privilege of availing, upon the terms 
prescribed by statute, of the benefits and advantages of the 
registration laws of the State. Therefore, the numerous au-
thorities cited and ably presented and argued by the learned 
counsel for appellant, in support of the contention that the 
assessment and collection of the tax in question violated the 
said provision of the Constitution of the United States, lm.ve 
no sort of bearing upon the issue in this case." 
'' A tax on property is measured on its assessment and col-
lection in the mode prescribed by statute, while a tax upon a 
license or civil privilege is imposed and fixed as to amount by 
classification of the persons or subjects required to pay the 
tax; and t11e powers of the legislature to impose the latter 
tax, to fu the amount thereof, and to classify the subjects 
upon which the tax is imposed, are well-nigh unlimited, so 
long as the classification is reasonable. 
" 'The power of the State to distinguish, select, and classify 
objects of taxation, has a wide ra.nge of discretion. Classi-
fication must be reasonable, but there is no precise applica-
tion of the rule or reasonableness, and there cannot be an 
exact P.xclusion or inclusion of persons and things.' 1 Cooley 
on Taxation (3d Ed.), p. 79, and note. ·· 
''The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 19 Sup. Ct. 522, 43 L. Ed. 786-'94, 
said: 'The question always is, when a classification is ma.de, 
whether there is any reasonable ground for it, or whether it 
is only and simply arbitrary, based upon no real distinction, 
and entirely unnatural. * f# * If the classification be proper 
and legal, then there is the requisite uniformity in that re-
spect.' 
. "The constitutional provision in this State relative to taxa-
tion is as follows : 
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· " 'Sec. 168. All property, except as hereinafter provided, 
shall be taxed; all taxes, whether State, local or municipa], 
·shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the 
territ~rial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shal1 
be levied and collected under general laws.' 
"This court held in Bradley v. Richmond, 11.0 Va. 521, 66 
S. E. 872, that the foregoing provisions in the Constitution, 
requiring· equality and uniformity of taxation, apply only to 
a direct tax on property, and not to license taxes, which do 
not admit of a tax strictly equal and uniform; and very clearly 
the privilege of recording· deeds, wills, and *other writ-
26<* ten instruments, and thereby securing the benefits and 
advantag·es of the registration law·s of the State, like 
the privilege of conducting a businesst is necessarily to be 
considered a proper subject of taxation, with the only con .. 
stitutional limitation upon the power of the legislature to 
impose the tax, that it shall be uniform upon the subjects 
of each class. Slaughter v. Com.monwea.lth, 13 Gratt. (54 
Va.) 774; Eyre v. Jacobs, supra; llf..iller v.
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Commonweal,th, 
27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 110. 
"The Rtatute nnder which the tax complained of in this 
case was demanded and paid, so far as applicable, is as fol:. 
lows : 'And on deeds of trust or mortgages, the tax shall be 
assessed and paid upon the amount of bonds or other obli-
gations secured thereby;' and provided further that, 'on deeds 
of trust or mortgages upon the works·and property of a rail-· 
road or other internal improvement company, lying partly in 
this State and partly in another State, the tax shall be upon 
such proportion of the consideration as the number of miles 
of the line of such company in this State bears to the whole 
number of miles of the line of such company conveyed by 
such deed.' 
''Here we have a classification made which puts internal 
improvement companies, whose line is partly in Virginia and 
partly in some other State, in one class, and all other grantors 
in trust deeds or mortgag·es in the other class. The rate of 
taxation is the same in a1l cases, and the tax is uniform upon 
the same class of subjects. That tl1e le~;islature intended to 
make the classification so plainly appearing in the statute is 
too clear to admit of clisr.nssion, and that the classification 
for the purpose of_ taxation ii:; valid seems equally as clearly 
settled by the decisions of this court. In fact, it seems that 
appellant does not deny the riµ:ht of the legislature to make 
such classification, but. denies that the classification has been 
made. As we have seen, the classification clearly a-ppears 
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upon the face of the statute, supra, and that similar classifica-
tion of persons and snbjects for the purposes of taxation have 
been held by this court valid and proper, see Bradle.11 v. Rich-
mond, supra; Insurance Co. v. Winchester, 110 Va. 451, 66 
S. E. 84; Tf! oodall v. Lyn.d1burg, 100 Va. 318, 40 S. E. 915; 
Ould v. Richmond, 23 Gratt. (64 Va.) 464; Eyre v. la.cobs, 
supra.'' 
In the case of Hart, et al. v. Board o( Com'rs. of B-u.rke 
County, et al., 134 S. E. (N. C.) 403, the Court said (p. 405): 
'' 'It has been said that perfect uniformity and perfect 
equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human 
mind can view it, is a baseless dream. * * * With reference to 
locality, a tax is uniform when it operates with equal forcn 
and effect in every place where the subject of it is found, 
* * * is uniform when it operates without *distinction 
27* or discrimination upon all persons composing the de-
scribed class.' R. R. Y. Lacy, 187 N. C. 615, 122 S. E. 
763; Edye v. Robe.rtson, 112 U. S. 580, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 
798; Cooley on Taxation, c. 6; Lacy v. Packing Co., N. C. 567, 
47 S. E. 53; State v. DPnson, ~89 N. C. 173, 126 S. E. 517." 
Only recently this Court held valid a law imposing in addi-
tion to regular merchants' licenses, a license tax for operation 
by a merchant of a distributing house in Com. v. Bibee Grocery 
Co., 153 Va. 935. In his opinion, Justice Campbell stated 
(p. 940): 
"It is the contention of defendant that the classification is 
m1reasonable, for the reason that a special class of merchants 
is created and tlie effect of the statute is to impose an addi-
tional tax on an instrumentality of the business. "'With this 
contention we are unable to concur. It was competent for 
the Legislature to place merchants operating a distributing 
house in a different classification from those merelv conduct-
·ing retail stores. There is nothing in the record to· show that 
the maintenance of a distributing· house is a necessary inciA 
dent to the lmsiness of operating several retail stores. It 
is unquestionably true that the maintenance and operation 
of a lar.!?;e distributing l10use in addition to operating seven 
retail stores imposes unon the commonwealth ancl t.J1e cities 
thereof a greater burden in fulfilling their obligations of 
propertv rig·hts, maintaining: streets and highways. as well 
as furnishing· sewer and other sanitary conveniences.'' 
· City of Hampton, v. Insurance Co. of North America.· 23 
So, too, in McKenny v. City Council of Alexandria, 147 Va. 
157, this Court held valid a license for each discharge stand-
ard at a filling station in addition to the regular merchant's 
license. 
It is a matter of public knowledge that associations operat-
ing under a mutual cooperative plan and not for profit con-
.duct their business in an entirelv different manner from those 
-companies which have invested capital and operate for the 
purpose of making a. profitable return to the investors. The-
Legislature of this and other States have always recognized 
this distinctiv(l classification with regard to mutual in-
28* surance companies, mutual building and *loan associa-
tiorn:; and similar businesses. Section 240 of the Tax 
Code of Virginia exempts certain mutual fire associations 
from all but a nominal tax. Section 4326-t of the Virginia 
Code exempts mutual insurance companies organized in or 
admitted to this State from all fees, licenses and taxes, State, 
county and municipal, except certain nominal taxes therein 
mentioned. We submit that the classification contained in 
the Act under attack is not only a reasonable classification, 
but is one which for years has been so recognized. 
B. E1;en if Section 168 o.f the Constitution of Virginia did:. 
applv, t7Le statute and ordinance would not violate it. 
The tax is uniform .. There is a classification, but the classi-
fication is with respect to a group of taxpayers who are pe-
culiarly benefited by tl1e results reasonably to be expected 
from the uses and purposes for which the tax is specified to 
be devoted, namely, the pensioning of the firemen and the 
relief of tl1e beneficia rics of firemen killed in the line of duty 
or who died from illnesses received in the performance o:f 
their duty. 
The tax which the ordinance imposcR is ''levied upon each 
and every person, partnership, company or corporation which 
contracts * ,w, :11< to is81W policies or contracts for or agree-
ments for firP- immrance. '' upon property in the City of 
Hampton. Tlrnt there are non-admitted insurance under-
writers who write fire insurance in the City of Hampton upon 
property in that city, but who cannot he made to pay the tax 
because they ~re not within reach of the taxing power of the 
State of Virginia. is certainly no argument againRt the im-
position of this tax and the payment of this tax by those com~ 
panies which are within the jurisdiction of this State. 
29* *The tax which Section 237 of tl1e Tax Code of Vir-
ginia provides shall be paid by fire insurance companies 
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.to the_ State is not paid by non-admitted companies to the 
State for the same reason.. They are not exempt from the 
payment of the tax either by the Tax Code in the one in-
stance, or by the ordinance under consideration in the pres-
-ent instance.. The ordinance does not discriminate between 
companies which are admitted to do business in the State o.f 
Virginia and those which are not so admitted. It imposes 
the tax upon all and in the same proportion. Plainly, the re-
fore, the tax is uniform. 
Therefore, to say that some of the property ·within the 
-said city is not insured at all; that owners of certain other 
property within the said city carry their own fire insurance; 
that some· of the property within the city is partly insured 
and some is fully insured; and that some of it is insured hy 
companies which are not admitted to do business within the 
State of Virg-inia, is not a valid argument against the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance. 
The same argument could be advanced against practically 
any tax imposed by the State upon any class of persons or 
property. The exempt.ions and escape from taxation by per-
sons who enjoy some of the advantages and protection of 
our State, as well as the legal inability of the State to reach 
certain classes of property of some of those who reside within 
the State, could be illustrated with respect to many, if not 
all; of the various forms of State taxation in this and every 
other State. 
The main principl~ is that the ordinance does not make 
discriminations or exemptions. It makes a classification such 
as is permissible under the Constitution and those who -may 1 
escape payment of the taxes are able to do so not because the 
ordinance permits but because of practical obstacles which 
prevent their being taxed. 
30«: "'Furthermore, if a person does not wish to insnre his 
property or to insure it for its maximum worth, or if he 
desires. to carry his own insurance, he is not enjoying the 
privilege of carrying on an insurance business but is taking 
a personal risk whicJ1 is bis c.onst.itutional right. He could 
certainly- not be taxed for accepting such a hazard. He is 
not env;agoed in the insurance business and he is not enjoying 
thP. privile~es which accrue to that bm:iness. 
Nor is it a valid argument to say that because the City of 
Hampton assesses sncll a tax ancl other cities of the same clas~ 
do not, the tax is unconstitutional because it mav result in 
the payment of hi~her premiums on fire insurance in those 
cities which do not provide for a similar tax. We understand 
that the rate of premium:c; upon fire insurance in this State is 
City of Hampton, v. Insnrance Co. of North America. is 
determined with reference to loss ratio, expense of opera-
tion and a defined per centum of profit per dollar of pre~ 
miums. It can hardlv be said that the amount of ·tax which 
has been assessed ag;ainst the defendant in this case dur-
ing the two-year period covered by the assessment could ap-
preciably affect the rate of premiums in any other city of the 
same class which did not lmve a simi1ar ordinance. But, 
hqwever that may be, it can be well fl.l'!!,1Ied that the effideney 
of :firemen will be increased hy tbe Rnowledge that they will 
be protected in the event of injury and their loved ones pro-
vided for in some measure if they are killed in the line of 
duty; and tJ1at this increased efficiency would result in a lower 
loss ratio. One large :fire in any community in the State of 
Virginia would destroy sufficient real and personal property 
to create a more compelling effect upon the rate of premiums 
than the tax imposed by the ordinance here under review, 
even if it should be adopted in each of the cities of the State. 
In the recent case of R-ichniond Linen Supply Co.· v. City 
of Lynchbur,q, 1.60 Va.·651, 169 S. E. 554, an ordinance of the 
City of Lynchburg assessing a gTeater tax against non-
3] • resident laundries than the amount assessed ng·ainst *lo-
cal laundries was attacked as unconstitutional on the 
following· gTounds: (1) That it deprived the plaintiff of its 
property without due proeess of law and denied it the equal 
protection of the law; (2) that it is against public policy; 
and (H) that the ordinance was arbitrary as to classification. 
The tax was not a. direct tax on the laundries themselves but 
a license for uses to which the products of the laundri(\s were 
put when brou~:ht within the corporate limits. The Court 
said ( 169 S. E. 555) : 
'' Statutes are not to be held unconstitutional, unless we 
are driven to that conchu·don. * * * 
"The Legir;;lature, for the purpose of taxation, may cJassify 
property. 
'' State Board of Tax Co1n1ni,c:sioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 
283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540, 543, 75 L. Ed. 1248, 73 A. L. R. 
1464, is a case in which a license tax on chain stores was in-
volved. The court said: 'Tl1e power of taxation is funda-
mental to the very existence of the government of the states. 
The restriction that it shall not be so exercised as to deny fo 
any the equal protection of the laws does not ~ompel the• 
adoption of an iron rule of equal taxation, nor prevent variety 
or differences in taxation, or discretion, in the selection of 
subjects, or the classification for taxation of properties, busi-
nesses, trades, callings, or occupations.' 
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"Aud further : 'It is not the function of this Court in 
cases like the present to consider the propriety or justness 
of the tax, to seek for the motives, or to criticize the public 
policy which prompted the adoption of the legislation. Our 
duty is to sustain the classi:fieation adopted by the Legisla-
ture if there are substantial differences between the occupa-
tions. separately classified. Such differences need not be 
great. The past decisions of the Court make- this abundantly 
clear'. 
·,,See~ also, BradleJJ v. Richmvnd, 110 Va. 521: 66 S. E. 872, 
affirmed 2.27 U. S. 477, 33 S. Ct. 318, 57 L. Ed. 603. 
"In Travelers' Ins·urance Co. v. Connecticnt, 185 U. S. 364, 
22 S. Ct. 673, 676, 46 L. Ed. 949, it was said: 'This court 
has frequently he]d that mere illequality in the results of a 
state tax law is not sufficient to invalidate it.' and that per-
. feet equality is a dream unrealized. This is particularly true 
as to license taxes. Bradley v. Richrnond, supra. Nor is it 
necessary that the same transactions be themselves alwayfi 
subject to the same tax." 
32* *The classifications were sustained and the ordinance 
was held to be constitutional. This ca.se is directly in 
point and is complete authority for the contention that the 
statute and the ordinance now before this Court do not lack 
uniformity nor are they arbitrary as to classification; and 
hence thev are constitutional enactments. 
In Com;nonweaUh v. Armom· and Cfo., 118 Va. 242, 87 S. E. 
610, affirmed 246 U. S. 1, 38 S. Ct. 267, 62 L. Ed. 547, it was 
held that a section of the Tax Code of 1915 allowing a manu-
facturP.r to sell his products at the place of manufacture with-
out taking out a merchant's license, but which statute re-
quired a merchant's lieen~e tax regulated according to pur-
chases to be taken out by every manufacturer, resident and 
non-resident, who sold goods, wares and merchandise at a 
fixed place apart from the place of manufacture~ and to re-
turn as purchases not only goods boug·ht from others but also 
goods manufactured by him and offered for sale at his store-
house, separate and apart from the place of manufacture 
"does not unjustly discriminate against the foreign manu-
facturer nor deny to him the eqnal protection of the law, nor 
attempt to regulate commerce. between the States, but is a 
valid enactment.',. Quoted with approval in Richrnond Linen 
Si1,pply Co. v. City of Lynchbu,r.<J, su.pra. 
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The constitutional requirement of uniformity in taxation 
does not even prohibit. the making of distinctions or classi-
.fications as between persons engag€d in the same business if 
all in the same elass are required to pay the same tax. See 
Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, affirmedi 227 U. S. 477, 33 
S. Ct. 318, 57 L. Ed. 603. 
33* *Nor is it double taxation to impose a license tax on 
a business and at the same time to tax the capital used 
by the ad valorem. system. 11-lorgan'.r; Case, 98 Va. 812; New-
port News, dfo. v .. New port News, 100 Va. 161; Norfolk v. 
Griffith, 102, Va. 115; Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Ya. 521. 
'' The provisions in the Constitution requiring equality and 
uniformity of taxation apply only to a direct tax on proper~y, 
and not to licem,e taxes, which do not admit of a tax strictly 
equal and uniform in the sense contended for. H el/rick's 
<Jase, 28 Gratt. 844. When Sections 168 and 170 of the Con-
stitution are read together, it is clear that it was not inteuded 
to iD:clude a license tax upon a business in any of the pro-
visions speaking of taxes on property. ~ * * In order to ren-
der the classification illegal, the party assailing it must show 
that the business discriminated ag·ainst is precisely the same 
as that included in the class wllich is alleged to be favored. 
N orfollc <fc. v. N ot·folk, 105 Va. 139." · 
Bradley v. Richmond, 110 Va. 521, 525. See also City of 
Richmnnd v. Drew1·y Hughes CQ._, 122 Va. 178, 195; and City 
of Richmond v. Merchants National Bank, 124 Va. 522. 
''No Question of don ble taxation is involved in this appeal 
as it iR well Rettled in this State that the provisions of" Sec-
tion 168 of the Constitution, requiring equality and uni-
formity of taxation, apply only to a direct tax on property, 
and not to licm1se taxes which do not always rest upon a basis 
of uniformity. Bradle:11 v. Rioh·mond, ll.O Va. 521; Poca.hontas 
Crmsolidated dl:c. v, Comrnonwealth, 113 Va.. 108." 
Connnonwealth v. Ribee Grocen1, 153 Va. 935. 151 S. E. 
293. And sP.e a.Isa Ould, dfo. v. Rir.hmond, 23 Gratt. 464; Oom-
m.nmoealth v. Moore, 25 Gratt. 951; Woodall v. Lynchbur.(J, 
100 Va. 318: ln.q. On. v. WinchestP-r, 110 Va. 451; McKenny 
v. Alexandrio,, 147 Va. 157, 136 S. E. 588. 
The opponents of le~slation with ever increasing fre-
quency raise the spectre of unconstitutionality before the leg-
islative bodies and by that means raise complicated questions· 
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i~yolving leg~l principles which can only properly be de-
ter:z;nined by the courts of last resort. Plainly, no legislative 
body would be justified in burdening the State with the ex-
pe~se of passing a statute which is clearly m1constitutiona.L 
But it is equally plain that unleRs a statute is clearly uncon-
stitutional, the legislative body should not be swayed 
34* to renounce *the le~:islation because of a doubt as to 
its con~titut.ional validity. The Supreme Court of the 
U1~ited States in the case of Nicol v . .Am.es7 173 U. S. 509, 19 
S. Ct. 522, 43 L. EcL 786, has summed up the question of uni-
formity and clas~ificntion with respect to taxation in the fol-
lowing simple and forceful ]ang·uage: 
'' The question always is, when a c1assification is made,. 
whether there is any reasonable ground for it, or whether it 
is only and ~imply arbitrary, based upon no real distinction,. 
and entirely unnatural.'' 
No such arbitrary or unnatural distinction or classifica-
tion is apparent in Senate Bill No. 168 nor in the ordinances 
which may be enacted witllin the limitations of that en-
abling act. 
C. Cases fro11i foreign .furisdictions in which the objection 
has been raised that a tax on tlie premiitrns of fire insur-
ance com1Janies for the benefit of firemen was -unconst-i-
tutional in that th.e tax was not wniform. 
In the case of Phoenix .Assurance Compafl,iy of Lonclon v. 
Fire Depart1nent of the Citv of M ont,qrnnery, 117 .Ala. 631,. 
23 Sou. 843, 42 L. R. A. 468, a statute required every insur-
ance company who received premiums within the City of 
Montgomery against fire to pay a certain sum of money for 
the benefit of firemen. The Court held : 
''There is no force in the suggestion that the tax is not 
uniform, and is wanting in equality. It is not an imperative 
requirement of the Constitution that taxes, other than taxe~ 
upon property, slmll be uniform or equal. This tax is im-
posed on all fire insumnce companies doing bmdness in th<> 
designated locality, and has in it every element of uniformity 
and equality which is requisite to support a specific tax on 
privileges or occupations. Phoenix Oarpet Go. v. State (Ala.). 
22 So. 627. In W e.c;tern U. Tdeq. Co. v. State Bd. of A.c:;.c;e,c;,c;. 
ment, 80 Ala. 280, it was said by Clopton, .J.: 'The rule of 
City of Hampton, v. Insurance Co. of North America. 29 
uniformity does not require that all subjects be taxed, 
35* nor taxed alike. The requirement is ecomplied with 
when the tax is levied equally and uniformly on all sub-
jects of the same class and kind. It extends to the class upon 
which the tax shall operate. Differeut occupations may .be 
taxed at different rates, and some may be altogether ex-
empted ; and the requirement of unif orrni iy is not infringed 
if the various classifications include all occupations similarly 
circumstanced and of. the same kind.' '' 
Here it will he seen that the Alabama Court, like our Vir-
ginia Court, recognizes the classification of subjects for the 
purposes of taxation and if the tax is levied equally and uni-
formly on all subjects of the same class and kind that the tax 
does not offend" ,the provision of the Constitution requiring 
uniformity in taxation. 
In the case of Fire Department of Milwau.kee v. Helfen-
stein (Wis.), 16 Wis., p. 142, a statute, applying to the City 
of Milwaukee, taxed Two ($2.00) Dollars upon every One 
Hundred ($100.00) Dollars of fire insurance premiums. The 
Court, on page 145, holds that t1oe act did not infringe Sec-
tion 1, Article VIII of the Constitution of that State which 
declares that the "rule of taxation shall be uniform, and 
that taxes shall he levied upon such property as the L~gisla-
ture shall prescribe." ' 
In the case of Hmulcrson. v. The London and Lancashire 
Insurance Company (Ind.), 136 Ind., p. 23, an act required. 
that every fire insurance company doing· business in that 
State and not organized under the laws thereof should pay 
to each county, 1wherein there W(1S a city having a fire depart-
1nent, a tax of One ($1.00) Dollar on every One .Hundred 
( $100.00) Dollars of premiums from fire insurance polillies on 
property within sn<~h count. It is pla.in]y seen that this statute 
did violate the coni:;titutional provision requiring uniformity 
since prope1·ty in the county and therefore not Rerved by the 
city fire departmenh, would if insured bring the premium 
within tl1f~ taxin,g· statute. whereas the taxes derived 
36* *therefrom wou1d bP used for the benefit of the firemen 
who operated wholly within the city within such county. 
For this reason. the Court declared the statute unconstituJ 
tional since it violatc-!d the requirement that taxes be uni-
form. 
It will be noted that the statute before fhe Court in this 
case Rllows only cities and incorporated towns having fire 
protection to assess the tax and, the ref ore, under the Indiana 
decision just cited the act is constitutional. 
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The case of State of Lo-itisiana v. 1lhe Merchants Insitrance 
Company, 12 La. Reports Annotated, 802, involved an act 
to tax each incorporated insurance company and agency of 
foreign insurance company in tl1e City of New Orleans the 
sum of Five HundrP.d ($500.00) Dollars annually for the bene-
fit of fire companies of such city. The Court held that the 
act offended Article 123 of the Constitution of that State 
reading as follows : 
'' Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State. 
All property on which taxes may be levied in this State shall 
be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as di-
rected by law. No one species of property shall be taxed 
higher than another species of property of equal value, on 
which taxes shall be levied; the Legislature shall have power 
to levy an income tax, anrl f.o tax all persons pursuing anv 
occupation, trade or vro.f essfon.'' 
It will be noted that by the act only incor~porated insur-
ance companies and ag·encies of foreign insurance companies 
in the City of New Orleans are taxed. Therefore, all unin-
corporated companies, incorporated companies not in the City 
of New Orleans and foreign insurance companies not having 
agencies in New· Orleans, altl10ugh all of them may write "in-
surance on property witl1in N cw Orleans, are not taxed. This 
statute is plainly unconstitutional since it does not tax all 
within the class selected by tl1e Legislature. On page 803, 
the Court said: 
"The legislature has not the power to tax a portion of the 
persons pursuing a given orcnpation, trade or profession. If 
it taxes one it must tax all in tlle State of the smne c:lass. '' 
37* * Again at page 804: 
"But an attempt to tax unequally and partially the busi-
ness of insurance upon marine and fire risks, ( a business not 
only lawful, hut in the highest degree commendable and use-
ful,) cannot be rendered constitutional even by hamlin~ over 
the proceeds of the taxes to another equally useful class of 
men. The imnosition is neither an assessment upon property 
for a benefit conf err eel and in proportion to the benefit. nor 
yet an exercfae or the police pmver in affixing terms to the 
granting- of licenseR for a pursuit wl1ich affects public order 
~nd g-ood morals; hut it is. in effect~ an arhitrary exercise 
oft.lie State power of taxation npon a portion of those who 
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' 
follow a. certain occupation to the exclusion of the rest, and., 
.as such, mm;;t be pronounced unconstitutional, null and void." 
The statute before the Court is free from the objection of 
the Louisiana statute. It provides that the city or incorpo. 
rated town shall levy the tax on all premiums from fire insur-
ance covering property within such city or incorporated 
town. Therefore, all insurers, whether they be associations, 
corporations or individuals, or no matter where their offices 
may be located, the tax is levied and it is, therefore, a uni-
form tax. 
III. Is there any constitution.al prohibition against the desig-
nation of a tax for a particular purpose? 
The fact that the tax which is levied under authority of 
the ordinance is designated for a particular purpose does 
not impair the validity of the tax. 
The State Constitution is not a grant of power, but only 
the restriction of powers otherwise practically unlimited, ex-
cept so far as restrained by the Constitution. The Legisla-
ture has plenary power and every fair doubt must be re-
solved in favor of the eonstitutionalitv of any act of the Gen-
eral Assembly. Strawberr11 Y. Starb1tck, 124 Va. 71. 
38* *Under the Constitution of Virginia, in effect in 
1879-80, no restriction was imposed against an assess-
ment of taxes upon abutting property owners for local im-
provements. The General Assembly of 1879-80 amended the' 
charter of the City of Lynchburg permitting that city to levy 
an annual special assessment upon the real estate abutting 
a street, in wl1ich ·water mahis wHre laid. In the case of 
R. and A. R. R. Co. v. Oity of lAJnchburg, 81 Va. 473, this 
ordinance and tax were contested as unconstitutional. 
The city assessed a tax against the plaintiff railroad com-
pany for water mains laid in streets abutting· property owned 
by the railroad company. The railroad company neither took 
any water from the mains nor used any of the city's water. 
It paid the tax under protest and contested the validity of 
the ordinance upon the ground that the assessment was un~ 
constitutional and void because (1) it violated Section 1 of 
·t1w Constitution requiring· taxation to be ''equal and uni-
form; and all property, hoth real and personal, shall be taxed 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as prescribed 
by law. No one species of property, from which a tax may 
be collected, shalJ he taxed higher than any other species of 
property of equal value.'' 
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The Court said (page 475) ~ 
'' The particular po!nts of objection are-(1) That the or-
dinance under which. the assessment was made disregards the 
constitutional mandate that 'all property, both real and per-
sonal, shall be taxed,' and imposes a tax on real estate alone ; 
(2) that it levies a conditional and not an absolute tax; and 
(3) _that it is arbitrary ancl discriminative .. " 
In the course of its opinion, the Court made the foUowing 
quotation with approval from No.,-folk City v. Ellis, 26 Gratt. 
224, regarding the constitutional provision requiring taxa-
tion to be· equal ancl uniform~ 
39* •"These assessments are not founded upon any idea. 
of revenue but upon the theory of benefits conferred by 
such improvements upon the adjacent lots~ It is regarded as 
a system of equivalence. It imposes the tax according to 
the maxim that he who receives tl1e benefit ought to bear the 
burden; and it aims to exact from the party assessed no more 
. than his just share of that burden according to an equitable 
rule of apportionment.'' 
In the Lynchburg case, the ordina~ce in question was held 
to be constitutional and in all respects valid, even as to the 
railroad company which was required to pay a tax for the 
improvement, though no benefit whatever col!ld possibly ac-
crue to it since it neither took any water from the mains laid 
by the city nor used the city's water. 
Section 170 of the present Constitution of Yirginia for bids 
the imposition of taxes upon abutting property owners for 
Such improvements as those mentioned in the Lynehburg 
case, siipra. However, since the powers of the State are prac-
tically unlimited, except so far as restrained by the St.ate 
Constitution, (Stra1~1berr:1J v. Sta.rbuck, svpra ), it is plain that 
the inherent power of t]1e State to levy a tax for a specific 
. purpose or to authorize a municipality to do so is not ab1·idged 
except to the extent of Section 170 . of the present Constitu-
tion. Therefore, it is plain that unlesE= ~ome provision of the 
present Constitution forbids the imposition of the tax~ the 
fact that it is to he used for a specific purpose will not itself 
invalidate the ordinance. In other words, the reasoning- of 
R. and A. R. R. Co. v. Lunchb1J.,rlJ, supra, applies with full 
forcP. to the present statute and ordinance and the principles 
upon which that decision was rendered a.re still fundamental 
conceptions of the con~titutional power.s of the Genera] As-
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sembly, despite the fact that since the decision was rendered! 
Section 170 of the p1·esent Constitution suspended the right 
of the State and the municipalities to levy a tax upon 
40* abutting· property owners exeept to the extent *stated in 
Section 170. But if Section 170 of the Constitution were 
repealed, the, right to levy such taxes would immediately ac-
crue without additional constitutional authority because that 
right is an incident of the inherent power of the State and 
denominating the tax for a specific purpose would not in-
validate or in any manner qualify the right to impose the 
tax. 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Walton, 182 Pa. State 373, 
38 Atl. 790, 61 Arnn. State Rep. 712, an ordinance passed by 
the City of Philadelphia appropriating $10,000.00 for the use 
of a police pension fund was attacked as unconstitutional. 
The Court said : · 
'' A judiciously administei·ed pension fund is doubtless a 
potent agency in securing and retaining· the services of the 
most faithful and efficient class of men connected with that 
arm of the municipal service in which property owners and 
residents of the citv are most vitallv interested. ReaSJOns 
in support of this proposition need not be stated in ·detail. -
They are such as readily suggest themselves to every reflect-
ing mind.'' 
And ~ee People ex rel. K oner v. Abbott., 27 4 Ill. 380, 113 
N. E. 696. 
There is no exception, exemption or discrimination in the 
Aet or in the ordinance. The ordinanee imposes the tax upon 
all persons and upon gro~s premiums lei:;s reinsurance pre-
miums less returned premiums, as authorized hv tl1e Act. 
The fact that the AQt does not use the term '' gro·ss premiums 
less reinsurance premiums less returned premiums" in tht) 
Section requiring the Commissioner of Insurance and Bank-
ing to make reports upon request of the Commissioners of 
the Revenue of t.hQ localities is no objection to the tax be-
cause the ordinance is in accord with the taxing sections of 
the .A.ct which impose a tax only upon gross premiums less 
reinsurance preminms less returned premiums, and if 
41 * the taxpayers claim *or feel that they are being· taxed 
on a basis other than that provided by the .Act and tho 
ordinance, their right is to Mk for a tax revision, remission. 
rebate or abatement in appropriate legal proceedings taken 
for that purpose. 
It is not shown or claimed in this proceeding that the tax is 
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upon any basis other than of gross premiums less reinsur-
ance premiums less returned premiums. 
That some may escape the tax· because they are not within 
the reach of the taxing power of the State is no more a prope1· 
objection to the constitutionality of this tax than would be 
such a claim against any other tax. which is imposed by the 
State, as to which might be raised the same contention in prac-
tically every instance. 
No taxpayer has the right to ref use to pay a tax because 
he objects to the uses and purposes to which the tax may be 
devoted. His obligation is to pay the tax and if he claims 
the purposes for which it i~ to be used, or is being used, are 
illeg·al, he may have recourse to a proper court to restrain 
the use of public. funds for an illegal purpose. There is a 
distinction between the obligation to pay the tax and thE' 
right to have the tax when paid used for public or govern-
mental purposes. 
IV. Do the ordinance or stat'U,foS in qnestiou violate Hection 
1 of .Article XITT of the .A1nendnients of the Constit1.dioti 
of the United States, and Section 11 of the Constitution 
of JT ir_qinia.? 
Section 1 of Article XIV of the Amendments of the Con-
stitution of the United States provides in part as follows: 
42* *''No State shall make or enforce anv laws wllich 
shnll abridge the privileges or immunities· of citir.ens of 
United States; 11or shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty or propert~r, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within it~ jurisdiction the equal protP~tion of 
the laws.'' 
Section 11 of tl1<.'.l Constitution of Virginia provides in pa.rt 
as follows: 
'' That no person shall be d(lprived of his property without 
due process of law.'' 
It is well settled that a corporation cannot claim the pro-
tt~ction of the chmse of tl1e Fourteenth Amendment which 
secures the privileges :md immunities of citizmrn of the United 
States a~ninst ahrid~:ement or impairment by the law of a 
State. 8elo1)(~r v. TT' n.lsh., 226 U. S. 112. 126; Paul v. Va., 8 
Wall. 1118. Corporations are persons within the meaning of 
the constitutional provisions forbidding· the deprivation of 
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property without clue process of law. Covin9ton db L. Turnp. 
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578. Hence, this phase of the argu-
ment is limited to the question of due process. 
· As to the question of due process of law under the above-
mentioned provision of the Federal Constitution, the Su-
preme Court of the United ~tates said in Missoitri'P. R. 'Go. 
v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520: -
' 'If the laws enacted by a State be within the legitimate 
sphere of legislative power, and their enforcement be at-
tended with the observance of thoi:;c general rules which our 
system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private 
rights, the harshness, injustice and oppressive character of 
such lawi;; will not invalidate them as affecting life, libffrty or 
property without <lue process of law." 
The power of taxation is fundamental to the very existence 
of government in the several States. State Tax Com,missionet 
v . .Tar:kson! 238 U. S. 527; 'I'onawa1Uln v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389. 
The Fourteenth .Amendment did not subYP.rt the tax svs-
tem of the States and it was not contemplated on its adop-
tion that it would restrain or cripple their taxing power, 
Soiithwe.c;tP,rn n,a Co. v. Texas, 217 TT. S. 114. 
43* * A State tax law, where conflict with Federal power 
is not involved. will be held to conflict with the •Four-
teenth AmP.ndment only when it proposes or clearly results 
in such flagrant aucl palpable inequality between the burden 
imposed and the benefit received as to amount to the arbitrary 
takiug; of property without compensation-to spoliation un-
der the guise of exerting the power of taxing.. When the 
power to tax cxi~ts, the extent of the burden is a matter for 
thP. discretion of the Jawmakers. F'ox v. Sta.ndard Oil Co., 
294 u. s. 87, 99. 
We cannot perceive any violation of Section 11 of the Vir-
ginia Constitution in the orclimmc~ in question. The tax is 
provided both by the ~fa h1te and by the ordinance to be RS·· 
sessed bv the Commissioner of the Revenue and to be '' col-
lected as· othm· levies of this citv are collected and all remedies 
to enforce collection of such levies shall apply". Therefore, 
the general tax machinery witl1 respect to the assessment 
and ·collection of the tax, and the rig-ht of the party who is 
taxed to be heard, apply. 
If, as we have urged upon the Court, the City of Hampton 
bas the power nuder Section 67 of the Oonstitution of Virginia 
to levy the tax, its levy and coJlection in the manner that other 
taxes are required to be levied nnd collected could not' be a 
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dolation of Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution, in our 
.judgment. The tax is levied for the use of the City of Hamp-
ton. The City of Hampton maintains a fire department for 
.the protection of the lives and property of its citizens and 
others who mav be within its borders. The maintenance of 
this fire department is necessarily an item of expense and 
the compensation and emoluments, effi.dency and morale of 
its officers and firemen are a matter of public concern. Any-
thin'g which adds to the compensation and emoluments of the 
.officers and firemen of the fire department or which raises 
their morale and efficiencv is a matter which affects both the 
general funds of the city and the general safety and 
44* welfare of the citizens. The police power *of the city 
is g.irectly involved in the maintenance of a fire depart-
ment of high efficiency manned with sufficient numbers and 
quality of personnel to adequately protect the lives and prop-
erty of the people of the community. r 
The defendant's contention that the Act violates Section 
1 of Article XIV of the Amendments of the Constitution of 
t.he United States was passed upon in the case of People v . 
. Fire .Assn. of Philadelphia, 92 N. Y. 311, and affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court in 119 U. S. 110. The act pro-
vided that an insurance company of another State seeking to 
do business in New York should pay to the· Superintendent of 
Insurance for taxes, ·etc., an amount equal to that imposed 
by the existing or future laws of the State of its origin. At 
page 3~4 the Court said: 
'' The second objection to the constitutionality of tlle act 
is founded upon Article 14 of the Federal Constitution, and 
·especially upon its vital clause whicl1 commands that no State 
shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws'. The argument here takes a widr~ 
range and touches upon questions of supreme and vital im-
portance as to the relations of the States to each other: and 
of each to the United States. Corporations are claimed to 
be 'persons' within the meaning and protection of the cla:ns~ 
referred to; its force and operation is carried beyond thC' 
limit indicated by the emergency from which it. sprang; and 
it is asserted to forbid unequal taxation and condemn such 
legislation as that umler consideration. But we think these 
grave questions are not before us and the clause relied upon 
has no application t.o the right of the court. It is a corpora-
tion, organized and existing under the Jaws of Pennsylvania; 
a creature of those laws, and beyond their jm~isdiction, carry-
. ing its corporate life and existence only by sufferance ancl 
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upon an express or implied consent. It could not come within 
our jurisdiction, or transact business within o·ur territory ex-
cept by our permission, either express or implied. * * * ~he 
situation then is this: The State, Jmving· the power to exclude 
foreign corporations, determines to do so unless they will sub-
mit to certain conditions. * * * "Then t11e corporation comes in 
it. agrees to the conditions. They become binding- by its as-
sent. The tax or license fee charged by the act of 1865 is one 
of these conditions.'' 
The Virginia case of Bradley v. Oit;l} of Richmmid, 110 Va. 
521, s·upra, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 
in 227 U. S. 447, where the Uourt said (p. 481) : 
I I ' 
.P•.I ! t : 
45""' *''But when the matterg concern the determination 
of the business or occupation which may be required to· 
take out a license and pay a tax as a condition of obtaining-
such a license, the power of the State is subject to no limita-
tions, save those found in the guarantee of due process and 
the equal protection of the law. In the present instance, the 
States has delegated this power of srlecting the businesses aucl 
occupations carried on with the City of Richmond, and of 
dividing them into classes and determining the amount of the 
tax to be paid by the members of each class. The State Su-
preme Court has decided that there can be no objection un-
der the Constitution of the State to such delegation. Neither 
do we see any reason under the Fourteenth Amendment why 
the State may not delegate to either the council of the city 
or to a board appointed for tlmt purpose tl1e power to divide 
such occupations or privileges into classes or sub-dasses, and 
prescribe the tax to be . paid by the members of earh such 
class. Gm1dlino v. Chica.an, 177 U. 8. ·183: Fischr>r v. St. 
Louis, 194 U. S. 361, 372; Liebenna1t v. Van De Carr: 199 
u 8. n52, !5nO. 
* * • 
"Finally, the plaintiff in error says that the actual opera-
tion of the ordinance has hroug·ht about an unjust and illegal 
discrimination in that be bas been classified in such manner 
as to subject him and his business to a higher tax, as a condi-
tion of issuing· to him a licenso, tlian that required of many 
other private bankers. This wns a clefC'nse made in the statA 
court. But that court, after saying· that it was competent 
for the council to assign private bankers to different classes, 
and that the plaintiff _in error has been required to pay no 
greater license tax than all others in the same class, said: 
" 'In order to render the classification illeg·al, the party 
assailing it must show that the business discriminated against 
J. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I -
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is precisely the same as that included in the class which is 
.alleg·ed to be favored. Norfolk, dbc. v. Norfolk, 105 Virginia 
139. This has not been shown in the present case; on tbe con-
trary, it appears that the business o-f the plaintiff in error 
is not precisely the same with that of other private bnnkers 
who are put in a different class and assessed with a less li-
cense tax.' 
'' That some private bankers were put into classes which 
subjected them to less taxation tban the class into which the 
plaintiff in error was placed is the only allegation which would 
tend to show discrimination. Bnt. there was evidence tend-
ing to show that the business done by the plaintiff in error 
and ten other persons or firms was that of lending· money at 
high rates upon salaries and househo]d furniture, while the 
kind of business clone by others in the same general business 
was the lending of money upon commercial securities. Ob-
viously the burden was upon the plaintiff in error to show an 
illegal and capricious clas~ification. 'l'he state court said 
that he had failed to show that these private bankers favored 
in the classification were doing the same business. 
46* *''In Ho-me Telephone Crnnpany v. Los An.qeles! 211 
U. S. 265, 280, 281, the complaint was that the citv, un-
der an authority to reg1.1late the charges for telephone~ serv-
i~e, had given a more favorable rate to a rival company and 
had thereby illegally discriminated. After saying that the 
allegation of such difference was 'too vag·ue to pass upon\ 
this court said: 
'' 'Whether the t.wo companies operated in the same terri-
tory, or afforded equal facilities for communication, or ren-
dered the same serdce does not appear. For aught that ap-
pears, the other company may have brought its patrons into 
communication with a. very much larger number of persons, 
dwelling in a much more widely extended territory, and ren-
dered very much more valuable services. In other words, 
a just ground for clnssification may have existed. Every pre-
sumption ghon lcl be indn lirecl in favor of the constitutionality · 
of the legislation.' 
'' See also Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 392.'' 
V. The burden is always upon him who asserts it to establish 
that n statu,f e i.c; 1mcnnstitutional. 
Taxation being the rule, and exemption therefrom the ex-
ception, constitutional and statutory provisions exempting 
property from taxation sbou]d be strictly construed against 
the exempt.ion and any doubt. should be resolved in favor of 
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the State. Hunton v. Commonu.,ealtlz, supra, and cases therein 
cited. 
In Strawberry Hill, etc., Corp. v. Starbuck, 124 Va. 71, 77, 
97 S. K 362, 364, the Court in speaking of this subject said~ 
''In determining· the -constitutionality of a statute, we must, 
-0f course, always bear in mind that the state Constitution is 
not a grant of power, but only the restriction of powers other-
wise practically unlimited; that, except so far as restrained by 
the Constitution, the Legislature has plenary power; and thM 
everv fair doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitu-
tionality of an act of the General Assembly. Ex parte Settle, 
114 Va. 715, 77 S. E. 496; Pine and Scott v. Commomi,ealth-, 
121 Va. (812) 822, 93 S .. E. 652." 
47* *Not only is thf' Constitution of Virginia a restraint 
upon powers othnrwise praeticaJly unlimited but "the 
Constitution is to he liberally construed, so as to uphold the 
law, if practicable". Citizens Mutual Bldg. Assn. v. Ed-
wards, 189 S. E. 453, 458. 
If the Court doubts whether or not an act is constitutional, 
it is its duty to sustain its constitutionality. Tobacco Assn. 
v. Warehouse Co., 144 Va. 456, 469, 132 S. E. 482, 486; Re'Ji-
11,olds'v. Milk Commiission, 163 Va. 957, 966, 179 S. E. 507. , 
VI. Do the statiites in q'ltestion exe1npt certain insurance 
companies from pavment of the tax thereby authorized? 
The defendant contended in the lower court that Section 
4340-k of the Code of Virginia exempts Cf'rtain reciprocal or 
inter-insurance premiums, and t.I1at Section 4326-t exempts 
certain mutual insurnnee company premiums, from the ap-
plication of the _!\.ct, in that each of the Sections referred to 
exempts from its provisions certain mutual insurance com-
nany premiums in tlrnt eac.h Section provides that the tax 
imposed by it shall be in Heu of all fees, licenses and taxes, 
State, county or municipal. Even if these Code Sections 
had the effect contended for by the defendant, the defendant's 
conclusion as to tlie validity of the Act here in question fa 
erroneous. However, the Sections relied upon by the defend-
1.mt do not exempt any class of insurer~ or insurance con-
tracts, or~ premiums, from the tnx which they ·respectively 
impose. 
Section 4326-t of the Code limitina· taxes on certain mutual 
insurance companies was passed by· the Virginia General As-
sembly in 1928, ancl Section 4340-k was passed by the Virginia 
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General Assembly in 1920,. neither of said Sections 
48* •having'. been amended since the Act here in question 
was passed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1934 
authorizing the governing bodies of applicable cities and townl'> 
to impos~ on "every person, partnership. company 0r corpo-
ration, which contracts on his> their or its a~ount, to issue-
policies or contracts for or agreements for fire insurance, an 
annual tax''. 
The broad scope of the quoted language certainly includ~s 
the classes of insurers and insurance contracts referred to in 
Sections 4B26-t and 4340-k and although the Act in question 
was passed at a later session of the General Assembly than 
the two cited Sections, nevertheless. our Legislature expressly 
provided that the Section relied on by the defendant as Cl'eat-
ing exemptions should not be so construed with reference 
to the Act in question, since by Section 3144-w it is provided: 
'' All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with any of the, 
provisions of this act are hereby repealed to the extent of 
such inconsistency; * • * ." 
It, therefore, plainly appears that neither the insurers nor 
insurance contracts referred to by the defendant are ex-
empted from the operation of the Act in question, and that 
the tax imposed by the City of Hampton applies equally 
against all insurance companies and insurance con tracts. 
VII. Does Section 3034 of the Code of Virginia exhaust the 
power of n1lunic:ipalities to provide for the relief of fire-
men and their dependents? 
The memorandum opinion filed in this suit by the Judge of 
the Trial Court and ,1lhich will be found at pages 87- 93 of the 
manuscript record held that whatever authority the City of 
Hampton may have for the levying, collecting *and 
49* appropriation of this tax must be traced through (u) 
Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia; (b) Section 
3034 of the Code; ( c) Chapter 387 of the Acts of the General 
Assembly of 1934 (Sections 3144-t to 3144-v, inclusive, of 
Michie 's Virg·inia Code, 1936); and ( d) the ordinance of the 
City of Hampton, Virginia, which was adopted on April 25, 
1935. 
The Court f urt.her held 
''In Section n034 the LP.gislature bas, pursuant to nuthorit.y 
granted in Section 67, expressly given to the cities and towns 
of the· Commonwealth the right to make appropriations of 
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public funds to charitable .in~titJ]tions ]pc&ted :within .their 
respective limits; so that· such ciJies and towns poss·ess the 
general power.'' 
• ! ~ • . 
l . . • ,, ! 
The Court further held in this opinion 
"I am of the opinion that when the General Assembly of 
Virginia enacted Section 303~ of the· Code as Section· 67 of· tlie 
Constitution provided it might do, it did all that was neces-
sary or proper to empower the cities, towns and counties to 
make appropriations of their ·public funds to charitable or.:. 
g-anizations; and that when it attempted to authoriz~ the city 
to levy a tax to be colleeted and set apart for a ·special chari~ 
table purpose and no· other, it exceeded the authority· granted 
in Section 67." · · · · · 
· ~he ·pertinent portion of Section 67 of the Constitutjon of 
Virginia is : · · · · '. , 
"but nothing herein ·contained shall prohibit the General As-
sembly from authorizing counties,· cities or towns to make 
such appropriations to any charitable institution or associa-
tion.'~ · 
Section 3034 of the Code of Virg~nia is, w·e submit, merely 
an enabling statute· conferring· upon co1ii1cils · of cities and 
towns ''for the p1upose of carrying into effect tl1e enumerated 
poweTs conferred upon them by this chapter anrl any other 
pbwers conferred upon them by ]aw" the right to make or~ 
dinances and· by-}aws and to prescribe penalties -for their 
violation, and to perform certain other duties and exercise 
certain other powers necessary·to the administra.tiou o.f their 
· ·· : respective gov~rmnents. · 
50* ,a.It furthermore provides : 
'' Cities and towns of this Cominortwcalth arc authorized to 
make appropriations of public fonds, of personal property, 
or of any real estate to· any" charitable institution or associa-
ti'on, locatea· within theii' respective ·Jimits; *. * * . The pro-
visions of this chapter shall jn no wise repeal, amend, impair 
or·· affect arty other power, right or privilege conferred on 
cities anq · towns- by charter or any other provisions of the 
gimeral law.'' - · 
We submit, tlierefore, that Section 3034 while it gives cer-
tain· statutory· authority and powers to municipalities · does 
_,,,. 
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not exhaust the constitutional power of the General Assem-
blv . 
.. That part of Section 3034 which is aboye quoted and which 
gives to cities and towns the authority to make appropriations 
of public funds to any" charitable institution is certainly 
not in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 387 of the Acts 
of the General Assembly of 1934 (,Sections 3144-t to 3144-v, 
inclusive, of :Michie 's Va. Code of 1936). These statutes are 
in effect in complete harmony. 'The only difference is that 
Chapter 387 of the Acts of 1934 adapts to specific purposes 
and in a detailed and comprehensive manner the power and 
authority conferred upon municipalities under Section 3034 
in general language. But both statutes are clearly authorized 
by Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the Court erred in 
basing its decision upon the grounds which are set out in its 
memorandum of opinion and which are carried into the final 
decree from which this appeal is sought. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion we respectfully submit to the Court that the 
ordinance accords with the statute which empowered the 
51 * municipality to pass it; that by *the express terms of 
Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia the ordinance 
is valid; that the ordinance does not violate the provisions 
of Section 168 of the Constitution of Virginia, first, because 
the ordinance imposes an indirect tax and· the tax, for that 
reason, is not within the provisions of that section of the Con-
stitution, as is clearly shown by an unvarying line of Virginia 
caRes, and second, that even if this ,vere not true the ordinanoo 
provides a proper classification within the terms of that Sec-
tion of the Constitution, and the tax is uniform; and we fur-
ther submit that the ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the .United States nor Sec-
tion 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, for the reasons here-
inbef ore set forth at length; and, the ref ore, the ord~nance 
is a valid enactment and binding upon the defendant in this 
case. 
],or the reasons hereinbefore given your petitioner re-
spectfully avers that final decree entered in this suit by the 
Trial Court wa-s erroneous and it re~pectfully prays that it 
be granted an appeal therefrom to this Honorable .Court. 
Your petitioner avers that on the 8th day of March, 1940, 
a copy of this petition was mailed t9 J. Gordon Bohannon~ 
Esquire, Counsel for the defendant. 
Petitioner further avers that this petition will be filed in 
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the Office of the Cle1·k at Richmond of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virg·inia, and it prays that this petition may 
be considered as its opening brief. 
Respectfully submit~ed, 
WALTER M~ E.V ANS, 
J. WILTON HOPE, JR., 
VIRGIL R. GOODE. 
52«: *I, Walter M. Evan~ an attorney practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do certify that 
in my opinion there is error in the decree complained of in 
the fore going petition, and that the said decree should be 
reviewed and reversed. · 
Received March 8, 1940. 
WALTER M. EVAN.S, 
900 Travelers Building, 
Richmond, Virginia. ·· 
lVI. B. WATTS, Clerk . 
.April 16, 1940. Appeal awarded by the Court. No · bond. 
M. B. W •. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
City of Hampton, a municipal corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
1J. 
Insurance Company of North Ameri.caJ a foreign corpora-
tion; Defendant. 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
Be It Remembered that heretofore, to-wit: at rules holden 
f o-r the said Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County, in the 
C1erk's Office thereof at the First February Rules, 1939, came 
the complainants in the above-entitled suit and filed their Bill 
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in Chancery_ against_ the def e:ndants _in th~ above-entitfod suity 
whiclr :Bill ·-iJi 'Chancery ·Is: in words· and figures" as follows,; 
tot.wit:> . ' . . 
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t·.1, ' 
I.n t~e Circuit Court of Elizabetli City County.· 
I • I , 
City of Hampton, a municipal corporation of the State of Vir.: 
ginift, Complainant, ·: .~ · 
3 V'. . . '.. 
Insurance Company of North America, a Foreign Corpora-
titm, Defendant.· 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
! ·, .'. 
To the Honorable John ·w eymouth, Judge of the aforesaid 
Court~· · '· · · · 
Your complainant, City of Hampton1 would show unto Your 
Ho.nor the fo_llowing f a~ts : 
1. T11at ·it is a municipal corporation of the State of Vir-
ginia .. located in Elizabeth City, County, Virginia. ·-. 
2. That the defendant, the Insurance Company of North 
A.merica, is a foreign corporation duly authorized to engage 
in the business of writing and issuing fire insurance policies 
in the State'. of ·Virginia for compensation. · · · · 
3. That at the·presen"t time, and when·the hereinafter stated 
obligations of the said· defendant ·to the complainant" arose; 
defendant was engaged ·in the business of issuing policies of 
fire insurance and it did issue such policies upon real and 
pe·rsonal property in the City of Hampton, in the State of 
Virginia, as .hereinafter stated, for compensation generally 
· · · - · known as· a premium paid by the a~sured under 
page 55 ~ each such pohcy to the defendant, durmg the yeai's 
· · · · · · · · · hereinafter set forth, and· w~ich acts were ,vi thin 
the purview and scope of the hereinafter mentioned ordinance 
of the City of ~ampton. · · · 
· ·: 4!. Complainant '-tvould further show that on the 25th day 
of ·April, 1935, the council of the City of Hampton, Virginia1 
duly passeq an orc"Hnance entitleq, '~ 4n Ordinance to provide 
for'. ·a: fire1n'en 's ·relier' fund;: to levy · a tax on fire insurance 
companies ; to provide for the reporting of premiums of said 
companies; and· the ·assessing· aii'd :collectioil of faxes £rom 
~Jaid''CO?hpanie's; ·to provide for· the election of ·trustees of a'. 
ffretnei(s ieli~~ rund to ~e set· up out of the proceeds of saicl 
111· •.. : .. , • . •' .. • - · · 
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taxes; to prescribe duties of said trustees; to provide finan-
cial benefits arising from said fund and methods of payment 
of said benefits, and for all purposes incidental to the esta b-
lishment of a firemen's relief fund~', of which a copy is hereto 
attached.marked ''Exhibit A" and is prayed to be taken and 
read as a part hereof. Complainant avers that the said oL"-
dinance became effective on the 25th day of April, 1935, and 
that it was passed by the Council of the City of Hampton, 
Virginia, pursuant to Chapter a87 of the Ac.ts of the Gen-
eral Assembly of Vhginia of 1934 and which is found also 
as Section 3144-t of the Code of Virginia, as amended; and 
which ordinance is still in full force and effect. 
5. Complainant further avers that the defendant issued 
policies of fire insurance in the City of Hampton, Virginia, 
upon real and personal property within the said City in the 
year 1936, for which the said defendant received premiums 
aggregating Five Hundred Twenty-six ($526.00) Dollars, a~d 
that the said defendant was assessed a tax for said year of 
:five Dollars and Twenty-six ($5.26) Cents; and that in the 
year 1937 defendant issued policies of fire insur-
pa~e 56 ~ ance in the City of Hampton, Virginia, covering 
- '. · real and personal property in said City from which 
the premiums received by the defendant aggregated Four 
Hundred Eighteen Do11ars and Sixty-eig·ht ($418.68) Cents, 
and that defendant was s:ssessed with a tax of-Four Dollars 
and Nineteen ($4.19) Cents for said year under and pursuant 
to the provisions of the aforesaid ordinance. And complain-
ant further avers that said assessments were made bv the 
Commissioner of Revenue of the City of Hampton, Virginia. 
6. Complainant further avers .that the said tax was as-
sessed for the uses and purposes set forth in the said or-
dinance, a copy of which is hereto attached marked HEx-
hibit A''; and that complainant had a fire department manned 
by full-time firemen at the time said policies were written. 
7. Complainant further avers that the said defendant, al-
though duly assessed for the said tax as aforesaid, has failed, 
neg·lected and refused, and still doth fail, neglect and refuse, 
to pay the same with the result that the said tax with legal 
interest and the penalties prescribed by law thereon, is now 
due and owins- from the said defendant pursuant to the pro-
visions of said ordinance and the aforesaid statute of the 
State of Virginia. 
8. Complainant further avers that all provisions of the said 
ordinance, of which a copy is hereto attached marked "Ex-
hibit A'', have been complied with by the said City and by 
the members of the Fire Department, that the said ordinance 
is still in full force and effect, and has been continuously in 
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effect since its effective dafo, to-wit, the .e5th day of April, 
1935; and that the defendant had proper notice of the assess-
ment of said taxes against it. 
page 57 ~ 9. Complainant avers that it is advised and be-: 
lieves that it has a right to proceed to enforce the 
said ordinance and the collection of the aforesaid taxes by a 
suit in chancery. 
Wherefore, and f orasmuch as your complainant is remedi-
j. less in the premises, save in a court of equity, where such 
1 matters are alone properly cognizable, your complainant 
prays that Insurance Company of North America, a foreign 
corporation, may be made party defendant to this bill of 
complaint; that proper process may issue against the said 
defendant; that the said defendant may be required to an-
swer this bill of complaint, but not under oath, answer under 
oath being hereby specifically waived; that a decree and such 
orders as may be required shall be entered in ,this suit ad-
judging the said defendant liable to complainant for the 
taxes aforesaid, and for the specific principal sum of Five 
Dollars and· Twenty-six ($5.26) Cents with legal interest and 
penalties prescribed by law thereon, and the specific prin-
cipal sum of Four Dollars and Nineteen ($4.19) Cents with 
legal interest and penalties prescribed by law thereon, and 
that writs of this Court be issued thereon directed to the 
proper officers of this Court to collect the same; that, if neces-
_sary for the proper adjudication of this cause, that the same 
be ref erred to one of the Commissioners in Chancery of this 
Court for an accounting of defendant's premiums and such 
other inquiries as this Court may deem proper; and that your 
complainant may have all such other, further and general re-
lief as the nature of its case may require or to equity shall 
seem meet. 
And your complainant will ever pray, etc. 
CITY OF. HAMPTON. 
By J. WILTON HOPE, JR., 
Its Attorney. 
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To provide for a firemen's fund; to levy a tax on fire insur-
ance companies ; to provide for the reporting of premiums 
of said companies; and the assessing and collection of 
taxes from said companies ; to provide for the election 
of trustees of a firemen's relief fund to be set up out 
of the proceeds of said taxes; to prescribe duties of said 
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trustees ; to provide financial benefits arising from said 
fund and methods of payment of said benefits and for 
:all purposes incidental to the establishment of a firemen's 
relief fund. 
BE IT ORDAINED by the Council of the City of Hamp· 
ton, Virginia 
L-That beginning on the date this ordinance takes effect, 
.and annually thereafter, there is hereby levied upon each and . 
every person, partnership, company or corporation which con-
tracts on his, their, or its account, to issue policies or con-
tracts for or agreements for fire insurance, shall, in addition 
to such other taxes as may be paid thP-m, pay an annual tax 
of $1.00 on each $100.00 or gross premiums, except reinsur-
ance premiums, collected and received by them, less returned 
premiums, from fire insurance policies cove~·ing property situ-
ated within the limits of this City during the preceding calen-
dar y:ear. 
2.-That the Commissioner of the Revenue shall make re· 
quest of the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking of the 
State of Virginia within seventy days from December 31, 
1934, and annually thereafter within the same period, to fur. 
nish this City with the name of each insurer which has within 
the preceding calendar year received premiums from fire in-
surance policies covering property situated within the limits 
of this City and the amount of such gross premiums, except 
reinsurance premiums collected and received by them, less 
1·eturned premiums, received by each insurer from fire in-
~nuance policies covering property situated within the limits 
of this City during the preceding year. 
3.-Th~ Tax shall be immediately assessed by the Com-
missioner of the Revenue based upon the information so fur-
nished him by the Commissioner of Insurance and Banking 
of the State of Virgfoia. The Tax shall be collected as other 
leviei:; of fhiR City are collectea a.nd all remedies to enforce 
collection of such levies shall apply. 
page 59} 4.-The Treasurer of the City shall be the cus-
todian of the taxes so collected and he shall keep 
in 
the ~ame as in a separate fund :u1d bis books shall show it as 
''Firemen's Relief Fund'' and said, fund shall be held, con-
trolled and appropriated as hereinafter provided. 
5.-Within ten. days after this ordinance takes effect, the 
members of the fire department. or departments of thi~ City., 
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at a meeting called by the Mayor upon five days notice, shall 
elect by ballot three Trustees who shall be qualified voters 
and act1µl residents of this City, one of whom shall be elected 
for a term of one year, one for a term of two years and the 
third shall hold office for three years or until their successors 
are duly elected ancl qualify nnless sooner removed. Their-
successors shall be elected for a term of three years, or until 
their successors are duly elected and qualify nnless sooner 
removed. Election shall be by a majority vote of the firemen 
present and voting·. The said Trustees, or any of them, may 
be removed pdor to the expiration of their terms upon ma-
jority vote of the members of the fire department present 
and voting at a meeting called by the Mayor upon petition 
in writing of ten per cent of the members of the fire depart-
ment for the purpose after five days notice to be sent by 
the Mayor to the members of the fire department. Any va-
cancies which may exist in the number of Trustees, by rea-
son of death, resignation removal or otherwise, shall be filled 
for the unexpired term by the vote of the firemen of the fire 
dep~rtment. at a meeting called by the Mayor for the pur-
pose after five days notice to such members, upon majority 
vote of the members present and voting. The Trustees shall 
receive no compensation for their services as such. 
6.--The election of such the said Trustees shall be certified 
to the Mayor at once by the cliairman of the meeting of fire-
men at which they are elected, with a tabulation of the votes 
for those elected aR well as for those nominnted but not 
elected. The Mayor shall ascertain whether said parties are 
duly qualified by residence and voting right. If they are not 
so qualified, the Mayor shall so state in writing to the Chief 
oft.he Fire Depa.rtment, or if there be more than mie: to the 
chief of each depmrtrnent, and the Mayor shall call a new meet-
ing to elect Trustees in lieu of those not so qualified. The 
Mayor shall have no other or further veto power over the 
election than that here stated. If found to meet the quali-
fications set forth in this ordinance. the same .c:ein Trustee~ 
shall subscribe to an oath for the faithful performance of 
-their duties under this ordinance before some officer author-
ized to take oaths in this State, the oath to be in such form 
as shall be prescribed by the 1\f.ayor of this City and the same 
shall be lodged with the Mayor. The Mayor shall thereupon 
certify the election and qualification for office of said Trus-
tees ofto the Tr(.)asurer, forthwith. The said Trustees shall 
elect one of their number as chairman. 
7.-Upon failure of the members of the fire department to 
agree to one or more, but not exceeding thr~e Trustees, or if 
the election shall result in a tie vote for one or more, but not 
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exceeding three Trustees, the Mayor shall thereupon appoint 
a Trustee or ·Trustees, not exceeding three, to fulfill the du-
ties of office for the Trustee or Trustees which 
page 60 ~ the firemen have failed or have been unable to 
elect. 
8.-The said Trustees shall file annual reports on or befo1~e 
the first day of January of each year, begfoning with Janu-
ary 1, 1936, with the Mayor of this City, setting out their 
transactions and the claims they have allowed and ·rejected. 
The Trustees shall keep minutes of the preceedings at their 
meetings. Two of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum for 
. the transaction of business. 
9.-The said Trustees shall receive and hear claims for 
the relief of firemen injured or disabled in the discharge or 
performance of their duties as firemen, or whose disability is 
a result of illness incurred in the discharge or performance 
of their duties as firemen and for the relief of the depend-
ents of deceased firemen whose death resulted from injuries 
received or illness incurred in the discharge or performance 
of their duties as firemen. The said Trustees shall allow 01 
disallow said claims and where the same are allowed shall fix 
the amount to be paid the claimants and may provide for pay-
ment in a lump sum weekly or monthly payments to the claim-
ants. Provided, however, that any claim presented for in-
juries, illness, disability or death of any fireman prior to the 
effective date of this ordinance shall not be allowed unless 
the injuries, disability or illness or the need for relief of the 
dependents of deceased firemen whose death resulted from 
injuries' received or illness incurred in the discharge or per-
formance of their duties prior to the effective date of this 
ordinance extends or is prolong·ed beyond the effective date 
of this ordinance; in which event any such claim allowed by 
the Trustees shall be deemed to have arisen as of the effective 
date of this ordinance and no allowance shall be made for any 
injuries, disability or illness or the needs of the dependents 
of deceased :firemen for the period prior to the effective date 
of this ordinance. 
10.-All claims shall be filed with the Trustees in writing 
and shall set forth with reasonable certainty the basis,· 
grounds and reasons for the claims and the same shall be 
sworn to by the claimants. The Trustees shall have the 
power to require the claimants and any other persons whom 
the Trustees may believe to have knowledge of facts perti-
nent to the claims to appear before the Trustees who are 
hereby empowered to administer oaths to such parties and to 
interrogate them under oath as to any facts bearing upon 
such claims. The Trustees may not require any evidence, 
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oral or documentary, which could not be required in a court 
of law. No such claim shall be heard or considered by said 
Trustees unless and until each of the Trustees has had rea-
sonable notice of the time and place for the hearing and con-
sideration of the same to be given by the Chairman, or has 
waived such notice in writing·, such waiver to be filed with 
the minutes of the meeting. No claim shall be allowed or dis-
allowed, except by the conc.urrent vote of at least two of the 
Trustees. A record shall be kept in the Trustee's minutes 
of the vote of the Trustees upon any claims presented to 
them. The action of the Trustees shall not be subject to re-
view by any governmental agency or official of the City Gov-
ernment. _The Trustees shall notify the claimant or claim-
ants of their decision upon claims filed with them. 
11.-The Trustees shall be the sole judges of the 
page 61 ~ amounts which shall be paid out of the ''·Firemen's 
Relief Fund", subject to the appeal as hereinafter 
provided. They shall certify the allowance of any claim to 
the Treasurer, who shall draw a City warrant payable out of 
the said fund, in such amount and payable to the order of 
such person as shall be designated in the certificate of the 
Trustees. 
12.-The Trustees shall consider themselves as the guard-
ians of said "Fireman's Relief Fund'' and they shall make 
no awards therefrom except in those cases which appear 
bona fide to merit the same upon the evidence submitted and 
the Trustees shall not discriminate as between claimants nor 
shall they permit auy bias! prejudice, partisanship or the 
appeal of sympathy, to sway their determination of the merit 
and justness of the claims submitted to them. 
13.-The Trustees shall notify the claimants and the chief 
or acting chief of the fire department of which claimant is 
a member of their decision upon any claim presented. Such 
notice shall be in writing and shall be personally delivered 
or shall be sent by registered mail as reasonably after such 
derision has been made as the circumstances permit. 
14.-Appeals from the decisions of the Trustees upon any 
claim may be taken by the claimants or by the chief or acting 
chief of the fire department to the Circuit or Hustings, Cor-
poration or other court of record having civil appellate juris-
diction over the ordinances of this city within ten days from 
receipt by the party appealing of notice from the Trustees 
of their decision. The chief or acting chief of the fire de-
partment of which the claimant was a member shall be con-
sidered as representing all of the firemen of the city other 
than the fireman who or because of whose injuries, disability 
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or death the claim is presented, and as such the chief or act ... 
ing chief of the fire department shall be considered the ad-
verse party to all claimants. Appeals may be taken from the 
decision of the Trustees allowing or disallowing a claim or 
because the amount allowed is insufficient or excessive. 
15.-The three Trustees shall be known as the Board of 
Trustees and claims may be presented to them and they may 
be cited as such and they shall make such reasonable regula-
tions to g·overn their activities within the limitations of this 
ordinances as may be plainly adapted to the proper discharge 
of their duties and the exercise of the powers hereby con-
ferred upon them. Such regulations shall be promulgated 
over the signatures of at least two of the Trustees and a Qopy 
shall be sent to the chief or acting chief of the fire depart-
ment and by him shall be transmitted to the commanding of-
ficer of each fire station under his jurisdiction in the city~ 
The commanding officer of such station shall read the sa:µie 
at an assembly of the firemen under his command and the 
regulations shall be posted in the fire station. No regula-
tions shall be made which will affect the rig·hts and interest 
of any claimant whose claim has been :filed with the Trus-
tees prior to the promulgation of such regulation. 
16.-The Treasurer shall keep an accurate record of all 
· receipts constituting said fund and all disburse-
page 62 } ments therefrom and shall report the aggregate 
of all receipts and the aggregate of all disburse-
ments in his annual report. All of such funds in the Treas-
urer's hands shall be kept separate from any other funds 
in the hands of the Treasurer. Any balances remaining at 
the end of any calendar year or fiscal year shall be carried 
over into the following year as an accumulation to the ''Fire-
men's Relief Fund''. -
17.-The Trustees shall bold a hearing on each claim :filed 
with them and shall give written notice to the claimant or 
claimants and to the chief or acting· chief of the fire depart-
ment of which claimant is a member, of the time, place and 
purpose of the hearing, which notice shall be personally de-
livered or shall be sent by registered mail not less than ten 
(10) days prior to the time set for the hearing. The claim-
ant or claimants and the chief or acting chief of the fire de-
partment shall be entitled to be heard and to be represented 
at such hearings and to present pertinent evidence. 
18.-If any section, parag·r1tpb, sE•nfa:mancf?. or clause of tbfa 
ordinance shall be, for any reason, declared to be unconstitu-
tional or invalid, such decision shall not affect the yalidity 
of the remaining portions of this ordina\}ce. 
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(N ote.-Italicised portion of above ordinance stricken out 
by lines through type·written words.--Olerk.) 
Passed by the Council of the City of Hampton, Virginia:, 
this 25th day of April, 1935. 
Attest: 
J. R. F. VAUGHAN, 
City Clerk. 
J. V. BICKFORS, Mayor .. 
I, J. R. F. Vaughan, City Clerk of the City of Hampton,. 
Virginia, do hereby certify that the a boye is a true copy of 
an ordinance passed by the Council of the City of Hampton; 
Virginia, on the 25th day of April, 1935. 
Teste: 
J. R. F. VAUGH.AN, 
City Clerk. 
(City of Hampton Incorporated 
Corporate .Real) 
Upon the back which appears the following: 
Virginia: 
In the C°ircuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
City of Hampton, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
'IJ. 
Insuranc~ Company of North America, a Foreign Corpora-
tion, Defendant. . 
BILL OF COMPLAINT. 
Filed in the Clerk's Offfoe of the Circuit Court of Eliza-
beth City County, First Feby Rules 1939, R. E. Wilson, Clerk 
by L. M. Giddings Deputy Clerk. 
· ,January 16th, 1939.-Spa and copy to Sgt of City of Rich-
mond to 1st. February Rules 1939. 
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page 63 } Rules: First February Rules 1939, Spa re-
turned executed. Bill filed and decree nisi. 
Second February Rules 1939. Bill taken for confessed 
and cause set for hearing. 
page 64 } And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Cou_rt 
aforesaid, on the 3rd day of April, 1939: 
At a Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City, at the 
Courthouse of said Court in said County on Monday the third 
day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hun-
dred and thirty-nine, and in the one hundred and sixty-third 
year of the Commonwealth. 
City of Hampton, a municipal Corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreig-n corporation, 
Defendant. 
DECREE. 
This day came the defendant, Insurance Company of North 
.America, and tendered its answer to the plaintiff's bill and 
asked leave of Court to file the same, which leave is hereby 
granted, and the said answer is accordingly filed. 
Upon the back which appears the following: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
City of Hampton, a municipal corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign corporation, 
Defendant. 
DECREE. 
page 65 } I ask for this decree. 
Enter this 4/3/39. J. W. 
J. G. BOHANNAN, 
Attorney for this Defendant. 
page 66 } And on the same day, to-wit: In the Circuit 
Court aforesaid on the 3rd day of April, 1939: 
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ANSWER. 
Yirginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City Count), 
City of Hampton, a municipal corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, . 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign corpora-
tion, Defendant. 
ANSWER OF DEFEND.A.NT. 
Insurance Company of North America, defendant, for an-
swer to the bill of complaint filed. herein, or to so much 
thereof as it is advised that it is material that it should an-
swer, reserving unto itself all just exceptions to the said bill 
of complaint, answers and says : 
1. It admits that the plaintiff is a municipal corporation 
of the State of Virginia. 
2. It admits that the defendant is a foreign corporation, 
duly authorized to engage in the business of writing and issu-
ing fire insurance policies in the State of Virginia for compeu-
sa.tion. 
3. It admits that, at the present time and when the alleged 
obligations of the defendant to the complainant 
pag·e 67 ~ arose, the defendant was engaged in the business 
of issuing policies of fire insurance, and that. it 
did issue such policies upon real and personal property in 
the City of Hampton, in the State of Virginia, for compensa-
tion generally known as a premium paid by the assured under 
each such policy to the defendant, during the years set forth, 
and that these acts were in tbe · intendedperv·zte and scope 
of the ordinance of the City of Hampton, mentioned in the 
said bill. 
4. The defendant admits that, on the 25th day of April, 
1935, the Council of the City of Hampton, Virginia, passed 
the ordinance referred to in the said bill, the title to which is 
set out therein and a copy of which is attached to the said 
bill and marked "Exhibit A". The defendant admits that 
. the said ordinance became effective on the 25th day of April, 
1 1935, anct that it was passed by the Council ·of the .City of 
Hampton, Virgil].ia, pursuant to the supposed authority of 
Chapter 387 of the Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia 
of 1934, but-the defendant denies that the said ordinance.ever 
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became effective and denies that it is now in force and effect, 
and says that, for the reasons hereinafter set out, the said 
ordinance was., when passed, and still is, void and of no ef- , 
feet. 
5. The defendant admits that it issued policies of fire in-
surance in the City of Hampton, Virg·inia, upon real and 
personal property within the said city in the years 1936 and 
1937, for which it received certain premiums. But the de-
. fend.ant says that the amounts thereof are not the amounts 
set forth in the said bill of complaint, as the premiums re-
ceived in the said years. The respondent is not advised as 
to what assessment of taxes for the said years 1936 and 
1937, if any, were made by the Commissioner of 
page 68 } Revenue of the City of Hampton under and pur-
suant to the provisions of the aforesaid ordinance. 
But the defendant says that the said ordinance conferred no 
authority upon the City of Hampton or upon any officer 
thereof, or upon the Council thereof, to impose or assess any 
tax upon this defendant, and says further that, if any tax 
was assessed upon the amounts of premiums set out in the 
said bill for the said years, such assessment was void for the 
reasons just above stated, for the reasons hereinafter set 
forth, and for the further reason that the amounts of such 
premiums as set out in the bill are incorrectly stated. 
6. The defendant is not advised as to the uses and purposes 
for which the said tax was assessed, except insofar a~ the 
same are disclosed by the ordinance itself. But the def end.;. 
ant admits that an attempt was made to assess the said taxes 
under the said ordinance, but says that such attempt was un-
accomplished and that the said ordinance is void. The de-
fendant is not advised as to whether the complainant had a 
fl.re department, manned by full-time firemen at the time the 
said policies were written. But if the allegation of the bill 
to this effect is true, this did not give to the City of Haip.pton 
the rig-ht to impose the so-called tax. 
7. The defendant admits that it has failed, neglected and 
refused, and that it ~till does fail, neglect and refuse, to pay 
the said tax, and says that its reason for so doing is that it 
is advised that the said tax was levied without any authority 
of law. It denies that the said tax, or any interest thereon 
or any penalties for the non-payment thereof are due and 
owing from it pursuant to· the provisions of the said ordi-
nance and any statute of Virginia, and says that 
page 69 } both the said ordinance and the said statute re-
ferred to are void and of no effect. 
8. The defendant is not advised as to whether the p~·o-
visions of the said ordinance hav:e been complied with by the 
·S6 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia 
citv or by the members of the fire department. It admits the 
passage of the said ordinance on April 25, 1935; but denies 
that the said ordinance is in force and effect and denies that 
it ever has been in effect. 
9. This defendant does not challenge the right of the com-
plainant to bring· this suit in chancery in this Court. But it 
does deny the right of the complainant to enforce the said o::.·-
dinance and the collection of the said taxes in anv Court or 
in any mam1er, whether by bill in chancery or otherwise. 
And the said defendant having answered all of the alle-
gations of the said bill, further answering, says: 
That the said ordinance, hereinafter ref erred to as the 
"ordinance'', is wholly void and of no effect; that the said 
Act of the General Assembly of Virginia ( Chapter 387 of 
the Acts of 1934), hereinafter ref erred to as the ''act'', which 
purports to grant to the councils, or other goveniing botlies 
of certain cities and towns in the State of Virginia, the au-
thority to impose a tax, which is hereinafter referred to as a 
"tax", without admitting that it is in fact a tax, is wholly 
void and of no effect; that the said ordinance and the said 
act are both unconstitutional and in conflict with the pro-
visions of the constitutions, both of the State of Virginia and 
of the United States; that the Council of the City of Hamp.~ 
ton was wholly without authority to enact the said ordinance 
and to levy or to impose the said tax; that the Commissioner 
of Revenue of the City of Hampton was, and is, wholly with-
out authority to assess the said tax; that the said tax is un-
constitutional and is in fact not a tax, and, if col-
pag·e 70 ~ Iected, would constitute a taking of the defendant's 
property, and, if the amount so collected is used, 
would amount to the giving of the defendant's property to 
others without authority of law, and that the said City of 
Hampton is wholly without remedy to e·nforce tl1e collection of 
the said tax. And in support of these allegations and of the 
allegations hereinbef01·e and hereinafter made, the defendant 
further says : 
A. That the City of Hampton is not of that class of cities 
and towns to which the General Assembly of Virginia has at-
tempted, by the act, to grant authority to impose such tax .. 
B. That the ordinance provides that the tax shall be as-
sessed by the Commissioner of Revenue based on information 
furnjshed him by the Commissioner of Insurance and Bank-
ing of the State of Virginia. The information which the Com-
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missioner of Insurance and Banking is required to furnish is 
with respect to the amount of gross premiums, less returned 
premiums, received by each insurer. The ordinance seeks to 
levy a tax on gross premiums, except reinsurance premiums 
collected and received, less returned premiums. The tax is 
sought to be levied, the ref ore, on a portion of gross premiums 
not taxable. · 
C. The steps necessary for the proper levy of the tax have 
not been taken. 
D. The said ordinance seeks to change the purposes for 
which the act provides the fund known as the ''Firemen's Re-
lief Fund'' shall be used, and moreover, seeks to provide for 
the payment of claims for injuries, illness, disability or death 
of firemen sustained or occurring prior to the effective date 
of the ordinance, if such injuries, illness or dis-
page 71 ~ ability, or the need for relief of the dependents of 
deceased firemen whose death resulted from in-
juries received or illness incurred in the discharge or per-
formance of their duties, prior to the effective date of ·the 
ordinance, extends or is prolong·ed beyond the effective date 
of the ordinance, it being provided that, in that event, any 
claim allowed by the trustees shall be deemed to have arisen 
as. of the effective date of the ordinance. And while the or-
dinance provides that no allowance shall be made for any in-
j1iries, disability or illness, or the needs of dependents of 
deceased firemen, for the period prior to the effective date 
of the ordinance, it does provide for the payment, after the 
effective date of the ordinance, of claims arising out of in-
juries, illness, disability, or death occurring·, before the ef-
fective date of the ordinance, or even before the effective date 
of the act, or before the issuance of the policies of insurance · 
by the defendant, in the discharge of duties, the perform-
ance of which was in no way of any benefit to the defendant, 
upon whom the tax creating· the fund is sought to be imposed. 
E. The ordinance provides that the trustees, whose elec-
tion is provided for therein, shall receive and hear claims 
for relief and shall allow or disallow said claims and, where 
the same are allowed, shall fix the amount to be paid the 
claimants, and that the trustees shall be the sole judges of 
the amounts which shall be paid out of the "Firemen's Re-
lief Fund", and that they shall certify the allowance of any 
claim to the treasurer, who shall draw a city warrant pay-
able out of the said funds, in such amount and payable to 
·the order of such person as shall be designated in the cer-
tificate of the trustees. And the ordinance further provides 
that the action of the trustees· shall not be subject to review 
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by any government agency or official of the city 
page 72 ~ government. And while the said ordinance subse-
quently provides for an appeal from the decision 
of the trustees allowing or disallowing a claim, or because 
the amount allowed is insufficient or excessive, such appeals 
may_be taken only by the claimants or by a representative of 
all the firemen of the City of Hampton other than the firemen 
· who or because o±: whose injuries, disabilitror death the claim 
is presented. Consequently the City of Hampton which, un-
der the assumed authority of the act, attempts to impose the 
tax, lias no power over its appropriation or expenditure, and 
does not make such appropriation. The defendant would, if 
the said ordinance were valid, be denied the power to have 
the proper Court review the action of the trustees and to 
prevent the use of the fund established by the tax imposed 
upon it for purposes other than those set out in the act or 
in the ordinance itself. The ordinance, therefore, seeks to 
·prevent the defendant, in the exercise of its right, to resort 
to a' proper Court to restrain the said trustees in the exercise 
of their supposed power, and therein seeks to abridge the 
privileges and immunities of the defendant and to deny to 
it the equal protection of the law, in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as is herein-
after more fully set forth. . 
F. That the funds sought to be raised by the imposition 
of the said tax under the said ordinance are not public funds, 
and the tax is not levied for a public purpose. Such fund 
does riot go into the treasury of the city for the purpose of 
meeting the governmental expenses of the city, nor is it ap-
propriated by the city. Such fund is constituted a special 
fund of which the treasury of the city is a mere "custodian", 
and of which the trustees are ''guardians''. The 
page 73 ~ ordinance provides, in section 4, that the fund shall 
be "appropriated as hereinafter provided", that 
is, by the trustees, not by the city, and the funds are not ap-
propriated by the City of Hampton, and the City of Hamp-
ton is wholly without authority to impose a special tax upon 
this defendant or upon a limited class of insurers for a spe-
cial purpose, and to leave the appropriation of such fund to 
trustees who a re not under the control of the city, but who 
may allow or disallow claims, and, when such claims are al-
lowed, may fix the amount to be paid, of which they are the 
sole judges, their action not being- subject to review by any 
g·ov~rnment agency or official of the city. The General As- · 
sembly, therefore, has no rig·ht, under section 67 of the Con-
stitution of Virginia, to authorize the City of Hampton to do 
what it is attempting to do under the provisions of this ordi-
City of Hampton, v. Insurance Co. of North America. 59 
nance. Section 67 of the Constitution does not permit the 
General Assembly to authorize a levy or the imposition of 
taxes, but only the appropriation of public funds for the pur· 
poses therein set out. The funds raised by the levy of the 
tax are not public funds and the appropriation is not made by 
fuili~ . 
G~ The act, which purports to authorize the councils of 
certain cities in Virginia to impose the said tax, and the or-
dinance of the City of Hampton, by which the said tax is 
sought to be levied, contravenes section 168 of the Constitu-
tion of Virginia, which is as follows: 
'' All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall be 
taxed; all taxes wl1ether state, local or municipal shall be uni-
form upon the same class of subjects within the territorial 
limits of the authority levying the tax and shall be levied 
and collected under general law. The General Assembly may 
define and classify taxable subjects, and, except as to classes 
of property herein expressly seg·regated for either state or 
local taxation, the General Assembly may segregate the sev-
eral classes of property so as to specify and de-·. 
page 74 r termine upon what subjects state taxes and upon 
what subjects local taxes may be levied.'' 
The act provides that the tax, when levied, shall be col-
lected as other levies of cities and incorporated towns are 
collected, and that all remedies to enforce collection of levies 
of cities and incorporated towns shall apply. The tax S6 
levied is not a license tax and the payment of the same is 
not made a condition upon which the defendant is permitted 
to continue to do business in the City of Hampton. Nor does 
the said City of Hampton endeavor, by the imposition of the 
tax, to regulate the conduct of the defendant's business in that 
city. The tax imposed is a tax upon the gross premiums, ex-
cept re-insurance premiums collected and received by the 
defendant, less retur~ed premiums, from fire insurance poli-
cies covering property situated within the limits of the said 
city, levied for a special purpose and for the benefit of a 
special class of persons within the said city, and levied against 
a special -class of taxpayers within the said city. The tax 
is levied up·on those insurers who insure property within the 
limits of the City of Hampton. Other insurers pay no part of 
the tax. All property within the City of Hampton and sub-
ject to the risk of damage by fire is not fully insured under 
policies of fire insurance. Some 9f the property within the 
said city is not insured at all. Owners of certain other prpo-
erty within the said city carry their own fire insurance. It 
Suprem·e Court or .Appeals of Virginia 
is a well known fact that fire insurance in many. instances 
is carried in companies which are not admitted to do business 
in the State of Virginia and which make no report of pre-
miums received and which, consequently, pay no part of the 
. tax. But these insurers receive the same benefit from the 
services of the fire department of the City of Hamp..:-
page 75 ~ ton, or the members thereof, as the defendant. And 
. while the defendant would be required under the 
ordinance to pay the tax based on the gross premiums re-
ceived by it, with the exceptions referred to, the owners of 
uninsured property, or those who carry their own insurance71 
would pay no part of such tax. And where the property 
within the said city is not fully insured, tbe insurance car-
riers writing· policies of fire insurance upon such risks wouldi 
be required to pay an amount less than that imposed upon 
insurance carriers which write policies of fire insurance upon 
risks which are fully insured. And insofar as such owner 
assumes his part of the risk on property not fully insured,. 
he makes no payment of any part of the tax. And if the as""" 
sured is liable as a co-insurer with the company issuing the 
policy of fire insurance for any part of the loss or damage 
whfoh may be caused by fire to the property. described in the 
policy, when a corresponding consideration in the rate for 
insurance on the property described in such policy is actually 
made, such co-insurer pays no part of the tax. But such 
owners and insurance carriers receive identicallv the same 
benefit from the imposition of the tax and from the services 
and activities of the· fire department, or the members thereof, 
as this defendant. And such .fire department performs no 
duty or service to the defendant which it does not owe to,. 
and which it is not required to perform for, the general pub-
. lie or other partnerships, companies, or corporations, which 
issue policies of insurance. The rate charged for fire insur-
ance is based upon the risk insured, the loss ratio and the ex-
pense ratio, and if the defendant were permitted to pass the 
burden of this tax to the owners of properties within the City 
of Hampton which are insured by it, upon the the-
page 76 ~ ory that the rate, based in part upon the expense 
ratios, including· taxes, and if other insurance 
carriers· were permitted to do the same_ thing, the owners of 
such properties would be required to pay, for the purpose of 
creating the said fund, a tax which would not be imposed 
upon the owner of uninsured properties or properties insured 
in non-admitted companies, and a larger tax than that which 
would be imposed upon ·the owners of property which was 
only partially insured, while all property owners receive the 
same kind and degree of service from the fire department, or 
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the members thereof. The burden, therefore, would be dispro-
portionate and unequal, and the classification between those 
who insure and those who do not insure would be unreason-
able. Owners of property not insured, but whose entire risk 
is entrusted to the protection of the fire department or the 
members thereof, would receive an eyen greater benefit from 
its efficiency than those who carry insurance. But they would 
bear none of the burden of the tax. And if the rates charged 
for fire insurance were increased because of such tax, the 
burden of such increase would fall on certain property own-
ers- who receive no benefit from the services of the firemen 
who are the beneficiaries of the fund created by the tax. 
Moreover, it is because of the fact that a fire department is 
maintained in the City of Hampton that the owners of prop-
erty in the said city obtain a lower tax rate than would oth-
erwise be charg·ed. The defendant, therefore, should not be 
required to pay such tax and the attempted imposition of 
the same on it is illegal. Moreover, the said ordinance makes 
provision for the payment of claims for injuries, illness, dis-
ability, or death of firemen prior to the effective date of the 
ordinance, and the defendant would, therefore, as hereinbe-
f ore alleged, be taxed to pay such claims now and 
page 77 ~ in the future, provided such injuries, illness, dis-
ability, or the need for relief of the dependents of 
deceased firemen, extended beyond the effective date of the 
ordinance, while the services in which such injuries, illness or 
disability arose, or in which such death occurred, were of no 
benefit whatever to the defendant. Moreover, certain classes 
of insurance companies or carriers which contract to issue 
policies or contracts for, or agreements for, insurance in the 
City of Hampton are expressly exempted from the operation 
of the act and from the power attempted to be conferred upon 
cities and towns under the act, by virtue of an Act of the 
General Assembly of Virginia of the year 1920, the same be-
ing· Chapter 259 of the Acts of the General · Assembly for 
that year, and by virtue of Section 4340-a of the Code of Vir-
ginia, and such companies or carriers are not required to 
pay the tax which is imposed upon the defendant. Such a 
classification for the purposes of such tax is discriminatory, 
and for the reasons hereinabove assigned, the tax is not 
uniform as required by section 168 of the Constitution of 
Virginia. 
H. The said act and the said ordinance violate Section 1 
of Article XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States and Section 11 of the Constitution -of Vir-
gfoia, in that they seek to abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, deprive the defendant 
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of its property without due process of law,· and deny to the 
defendant the equal protection of the law. The ordinance in 
question is not a proper exercise of the taring power of the 
said City of Hampton, and the General Assembly of Virginia 
has and had no po,ver to vest such city with any right to levy 
or impose such a tax, and the said city was and is wholly 
- without authority to impose such tax. The City of 
page 78 } Hampton in maintaining its fire department is 
exercising a municipal function of a governmental 
nature, for the benefit of all the property owners within its 
limits. The attempted imposition upon the defendant of the 
said tax, which is not levied for the use of the said city or 
for the maintenance or use of a paid fire department under 
the control of the mayor, city council or other governing 
body of such city, but for the purpose of creating a fund to 
be used for the purposes set out in the said act and in the 
said ordinance, is an attempt to take the defendant's prop-
erty and the property of others similarly situated and to turn 
it over to others and so, in effect, to confiscate the property 
of the defendant and arbitrarily to appropriate its property 
or inc.ome and to deprive it of its said property without due 
process of law and in contravention of the constitutional pro-
visions referred to above. The purpose of this attempted 
exercise of the power of taxation is not to raise revenue for 
the use of the said city for public purposes, but, by the con-
fiscation of the property of one class of taxpayers under the 
guise of taxation, to create a fund to be used for the benefit 
of another and a limited class, to the members of which it is 
to be distributed by trustees whose actions are not subject to 
review by any governmental agency or official of the said 
city government, and the defendant is sought to be denied 
the privilege of having any Court to review the action of the 
said trustees in the premises. And the exemption from the 
burden of this tax of the owners of property within the said 
city of Hampton which is not insured, or upon which such 
owners carry their own insurance, and the imposition of a 
-lower tax upon the owners or insurers of property only par-
tially insured, and the complete exoneration of 
page 79 } such owners where they assume a portion of the 
risk, and the reduction of the burden of insurers 
which carry only a portion of the risk, all of which receive 
the same benefit from the services of the fire department of 
the City of Hampton as the defendant, and the exemption of 
certain classes of insurance carriers from the imposition 
of the tax as hereinbefore alleged, are unjust discriminations 
ag;ainst the defendant and a denial to it of the equal protec-
tion of the law. And the defendant says that the imposition 
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of the tax upon the defendant, which is not imposed upon 
others under the same circumstances and conditions, consti· 
tutes a discrimination and a classification which does not 
rest upon any reason or public policy, and if the said act 
.and the said ordinance is enforced against it, it will abridge 
the privileges to which it is entitled as hereabove set forth. 
The defendant accordingly prays that the City of Hampton, 
its officers, servants, agents and employees, may, upon the 
.hearing· of this cause, be enjoined from collecting from the 
defendant the tax sought to be levied and imposed under the 
said ordinance, and that the said act and the said ordinance 
may be declared null and yoid and without effect. And the 
said defendant having fully answered the said bill, now prays 
to be hence dismissed. 
INSURANCE COMP~NY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
By J. GORD.AN BOH.A.NNA.."f\J", 
Its Attorney. 
Upon the back which appears the following: 
Virginia~ 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
page 80 ~ City of Hampton, a municipal Corporation of the 
.State of Virginia, Complainant, · 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign corporation, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDA.t~T. 
page 81 } And at another day, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
City of Hampton, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a Foreign Corpora-
tion, Defendant. 
Supi_:eme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
STIPULATION OF COUNSEL~ 
.-
It is stipulated and agreed between counsel for the com-
plainant and for the defendant that in the above-entitled cause 
the Court may consider as facts established, in addition to 
any admissions in the pleadings available to the opposipg 
party, the following·: 
1. That the defendant is a stock -fire insurance company. 
2. That the amounts set forth in paragTaph 5 of the bill 
of complaint should be as follows: 
1936 Premiums $ 418.68-tax $ 4.19 
1937 Premiums 2,211.26-tax 22.11 
3. That a portion of the real and personal property within 
the City of Hampton and subject to the risk of 
page 82 ~ damage by fire is fully insured and that a portion 
thereof is not fully insured, under policies of fire 
insurance, that is, is insured for less than its full value; that 
a portion of ~uch property is not insured; that insurance on 
the portion of the said property is carried in companies which 
are not admitted to do business in the State of Virginia and 
have never qualified to do business in this State and which 
make no reports of premiums received and which are not 
reached by the tax imposed under the ordinance. 
4. That cities and towns within the State of Virginia are 
classified in accordance with the application of certain grad-
in~· schedules and that the City of Hampton, along with cer-
tam other cities in the State of Virginia, is a city of tI1e sec-
ond class. 
5. That a portion of the real and personal property within 
the City of Hampton and subject to the risk of damage by 
fire is insured in mutual fire insurance companies and that a 
portion thereof is insured under reciprocal and inter-insur-
ance contracts. 
6. That, under Section 237 of the Tax Code of Virginia, 
non-admitted insurance companies, although there are such 
which write the classes of insurance specified in that section, 
do not pay the tax for which that section provides. 
7. That the City of Hampton has at all times since the 
passag·e of the ordinance filed as Exhibit A with the bill of 
complaint had a fire department in which were employed three 
full-time paid firemen, namely, an engineer and first and sec-
ond assistant engineers, and it has had also seventy volunteer 
.firemen, composing a fire company organized under chapter 
125 of the Code of Virginia. 
I. 
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8. That all things required by the said ordinance to be done 
by the City of Hampton, its fire department and 
page 83 } others, to administer said ordinance and to make 
the same effective, have been complied with. 
tT. ·wrLTON HOPE, JR., and 
WALLERSTEIN, GOODE & EVANS, 
Attorney for the Plaintiff, 
.T. GORDAN BOHANNAN, 
Attorney for the Defendant. 
page 84 ~ And at another day, to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
aforesaid, on the 3rd day of August, 1939: 
Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City on Thurs .. 
day the third day of August in the year of our Lord one thou-
sand nine hundred and thirty-nine. 
City of Hampton a municipal corporation of Virgfoia, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign corporation. 
IN CHANCERY. 
For reasons appearing- satisfactory to the Court, this 
cause is ref erred to the Judge of this Court for such orders 
and decrees to be entered in vacation as may be entered in 
term. · 
Upon the back which appears the following: 
The City of Hampton, etc., 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America. 
DECREE. 
Enter this 8/3/39. 
J.W. 
And at anothm~ day to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
page 85 ~ aforesaid November loth, 1939. 
Circuit Court of the County of Elizabeth City on Friday the 
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· tenth day of November, in the year of, our Lord one thousand 
, nine .hundred· and thirty-nine. 
City of Hampton, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign Corporati_on, 
Defendant. 
DECREE. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the bill of 
complaint filed ·herein a.nd the Exhibit filed therewith, upon 
the answer of the defendant, and upon the stipulation of 
counsel for the plaintiff. .and the defendant, and was argued 
by counsel. 
Upon consideration whereof, and for the reasons set forth 
in a memorandum opinion .filed among the papers in this 
cause and made a part of the record, the Court being of the 
opinion that Chapter 387 of the Acts of the General Assem- . 
bly of Virg·inia for the year 1934, insofar as the same at-
tempts to authorize the council or other governing body of 
. certain cities and incorporated towns, in its discretion, to 
impose on every person, partnership, company or corporation, 
which contracts on his, their or its account, to issue policies 
or contracts for, or agreements for, fire insurance, an annual 
license tax not in excess of One Dollar ($1.00) on 
page 86 ~ each One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) of gross 
premiums, except reinsurance premiums, collected 
and received, less returned premiums, from fire insurance 
policies covering property situated within the limits of any 
such city or incorporated town, and insofar as the same pro-
vides how the tax, when levied, shall be collected, controlled· 
and appropriated, and used, is unconstitutional and void, and· 
that the ordinance of the City of Hampton, passed by the 
Council of the said city on the 25th day of April, 1935, pur-
suant to the provisions of the said Act of the General As-
sembly of Virginia, is likewise unconstitutional and void, doth 
so decide, and doth adjudge, order and decree that the relief 
prayed for in the bill of complaint be, and the same is, de-
nied, tha.t the said ·bill of complaint be dismissed, and, in 
accordance with the prayer of the defendant's answer, the 
Court doth further adjudge, order and decree that the City 
of Hampton, its officers, servants, agents and employees, be, 
and the same are hereby, enjoined from collecting from the 
defendant the tax sought to be levied and imposed under the 
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said ordinance or the said· act. And nothing further remain-
ing to be done in this cause, the same is removed from :the 
docket, and the cost thereof shall be paid by the complainant, 
to which action of the court the complainant duly objected 
.and excepted. 
Upon the baek which a-ppears the following: 
City of Hampton, a municipal corporation of the State of 
Virginia, 
v. 
Insuranee Company of North America, a foreign corporation. 
DECREE. 
I ask for this decree, Attorney for the defendant. Enter 
this 11/10 /39. 
J. w. 
page 87 } ~nd at another day to-wit: In the Circuit Court 
of the County afore said. 
The City of Hampton, a. Municipal Corporation, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign corpora~ 
tion. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION. 
This is a suit in chancery brought by the City of Hanmton, 
a municipal corporation, to collect the tax levied under and 
to enforce the provisions of an ordinance of the said city 
adopted April 25, 1935, pursuant to Chapter 387 of Acts 
of the General Assembly of ,Virginia, 1934, and Section 3144t · 
of the Code as amended, which Act· empowers the cities, 
counties and towns to enact ordinances providing for the levy- · 
ing of a certain tax on insurance companies of $1.00 per 
$100.00 upon gross premiums collected from policies written 
in the City of Hampton by such companies; except re-insur-
ance premiums, less returned premiums, which tax so col-
lected is to be set up as a "Firemen's Relief Fund" under 
provisions of the Act and the ordinance, which ordinance is 
exhibited in the suit, and which will be r.eferred to hereafter. 
The defendant company answered, denying liability, and 
raising various questions as to the constitutionality of the 
act and the Ordinance passed under it. 
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By: stipulation of the :parties1 there was an agreed state 
of facts to the adoption of the ordinance, the formation of 
the Firemen's Relief Organization, the appointment of Trus-
tees, etc., so that no evidence was presented to 
page 88 ~ the Court other than the agreed facts. 
As "Firemen's Relief" has been the subject of 
legislation in Virginia at intervals for more than thirty years,. 
it is proper to set out its progress briefly: 
In 1908 the General Assembly passed an act wl1ich had 
as its object tbe general purposes of the Act and tbe Ordi-
nance which are involved in the case at bar. This Act was 
assailed by the Aetna Insurance Company, which sought to 
enjoin Joseph Button, Insurance Commissioner, from collect-
ing the tax. Judge Grinnan, of the Chancery Court for the 
City of Richmond, overruled a demurrer in this case, and 
declared the Act unconstitutional on the ground that it ap-
propriated money to a. cbaritable institution not owned or 
co~trolled by the State, thereby violating Section 67 of the 
Constitution, and because it imposed a tax for a private 
and not a public purpose. An appeal was refused in this 
case; which in effect, amounted to an affirmance by the Su-
preme Court of Appeals (See 18 V. L. R., p. 97). 
In 1932 another Act was passed by the General Assem-
bly which differed in no great degree from the Act of 1908. 
The validity of this Act was contested by the National Fire 
Insurance Company of Hartford, which company paid the tax 
under protest and filed its Bill for recovery and prayed that 
the Act be declared unconstitutional. Judge Gunn of the 
Circuit Court for the City of R.ichmond decided in the Com-
pany's favor, and declared the Act unconstitutional, which 
decision was on appeal affirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. (See Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
National Fire Insur(J/rwe Co. of Hartford, 161 Va.,. 
page 89 ~ p. 737.) 
The General Assembly of Virginia at the ses-
sion of 1934 passed an Act containing the following sections 
which are pertinent for the purposes of this case. 
No. 3144t. Tax on accoi1,nts collected by insurance co~ 
pmiies.-The council or other governing body of each and 
every city and incorporated town, which Jrns or may here-
after have a fire company or companies organized under 
the provisions of chapter one hundred and twenty-five of the 
Code of Virginia, or a paid fire department under the con-
trol of the mayor, city council or other governing body of 
I. 
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.:;uch city or incorporated town, is hereby authorized, in its 
discretion, to impose on every person, partnership, company 
or corporation, which contracts on his, their or its account, 
to issue policies or contracts for 01· agreements for fire in-
surance, an annual tax not in excess of one ($1.00) dollar 
on each one hundred ($100.00) dollars of gross premiums, 
except re-insurance premiums, collected and received, less 
returned premiums, from fire insurance policies covering 
property situated within the limits of such city or incorpo-
rated town. 
No.3144u. Nmries of insurer fitrnished.-The Commissioner 
of Insurance and Banking of the State of Virginia shall 
after seventy (70) days from the thirty-first day of December 
of each year, upon the request of any such city or incorpo-
rated town, promptly furnish to such city or incorporated 
town the name of each insurer which has within the preceding 
calendar year received premiums from fire insurance policies 
covering property situated within the limits of such city or 
incorporated town and the amount of such gross ptemiums, 
less returned premiums,. received by each insurer from fire 
insurance policies covering property situated within the limits 
of such city or incorporated town during the preceding year. 
No. 3144v. How tax levied and collected.-The tax, when 
levied, shall be collected as other levies of cities and incor-
porated towns are collected and all remedies to enforce col-
lection of levies of cities and incorporated towns shall apply, 
and the Treasurer of such city or incorporated town shall 
keep it as a separate fund, and his books shall show it as 
''firemen's relief fund'' and said fund shall be held, con-
trolled and appropriated as provided by the respective coun-
cils or other governing bodies of such cities or incorporated 
towns; provided, that the said fund shall be used for the 
relief of firemen injured or disabled in the discharge or 
performance of their duties or whose disability is a result 
of illness incurred in the discharg·e or performance of their 
duties, and for the relief of the dependents of deceased fire-
men whose death resulted from injuries received or illness 
incurred in the discharge or performance of their duties, and 
for the necessary expenses incident to the administration of 
such fund. · 
page 90 ~ This Act of 1934 was obviously framed to meet 
the constitutional objections which had been raised 
and sustained in the cases involving the 1908 and 1932 Acts. 
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It may be conceded at the outset that whatever authority 
the City of Hampton may have for the levying, collecting and. 
appropriation of this tax must be traced through (a) that por-
tion of Section 67 of the Constitution of Virginia which is 
contained in the last clause in that section, which is as fol-
lo'W's: · 
-"but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the General 
Assembly from autho1·izing counties, cities or towns to make 
such appropriations to any charitable institution or associa-
tion.'' 
(b) Section 3034 of the Code ; ( c) the Act· of the Assembly 
. of 1934; and (d) the ordinance of the City of Hampton of 
1935. 
Section 67 of the Constitution in its entirety reads as fol-
lows: 
"Sec. 67. LIMITATIONS ON APPROPRIATION BY 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO CHARITABLE AND OTHER 
INSTITUTIONS. EXCEPTION~. (new).-The General 
Assembly shall not make any appropriation of public funds, 
of personal property, or of any real estate, to any church 
or sectarian society, association, or institution of any kind 
whatever, which is entirely or partly, directly or indirectly, 
. controlled by any church or sectarian society; nor shall the 
General Assembly make any like appropriation to any chari-
table institution, which is not owned or controlled by the State; 
except that it may, in its discretion, make appropriations 
to non-sectarian institutions for the reform of youthful crimi-
nals ; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the General 
Assembly from authorizing counties, cities or to'\\111s to make 
such appropriations to any charitable institution or associa-
tion. 
It would appear, therefore, that what the Constitution au-
thorizes the Legislature to do, insofar as this case is con-
cerned, may be expressed as follows: 
But nothing herein contained shall prohibit the General 
Assembly from authorizing counties, cities and towns from 
making appropriations of public funds to any charitable in-
stitution or association. 
In Section 3034 the Legislature has, pursuant 
page 91 ~ to authority granted in Section 67, expressly given 
to the cities and towns of the CoIJ1monwealth the 
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l'ight to make appropriations of public funds to charitable 
institutions located within their respective limits; so that such 
cities ~d towns possess the general power. 
It is likewise true that the Legislature may authorize coun .. 
ties, cities and towns to levy any taxes which do not violate the 
Constitutional limitations with reference to taxation. 
The effect of Sections 3144t, 3144u and 3144v, is to authorize 
the counties, cities and towns to levy a certain tax upon cer- _ 
tain premiums collected by fire insurance companies for the 
definite purpose of creating a fund which must be devoted 
to the relief of disabled :firemen, etc., and is designated and set 
.apart for that purpose. 
The defendant readily concedes that the city has the :right 
to make appropiiations for charity out of its public funds; 
but denies that the funds· described are public funds, denies 
that they are appropriated, and raises many other questions 
with reference thereto; and contends that in the levy and col-
lection of said tax for t~s purpose under Section 3144-t, et 
seq., and the city ordinance, the city is following neither the 
letter nor the spirit of Section 67 and the consequent Section 
3034 of the Code. The def endaut also takes the position that 
the Act of 1934 and the ordinance violate Sections 168 and 
188 of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of Article XIV 
of the Constitution of the United States and Section 11 of 
the Constitution of Virginia. 
. The City of Hampton needed no further authority to make 
appropriations for charitable pm:poses from its public funds 
than that given by Section 3034 of the Code. The sole question · 
before us is whether the Legislature has exceeded 
page 92 } its c.onstitutional power in the enactment of Sec-
tions 3144-t, et seq. If it has it follows that the 
ordinance of 1935 of the City of Hampton is invalid. 
There are other sections of the Code which provide optional. 
methods by which the cities, towns and counties may provide 
for their disabled :firemen, etc. (See Section 3144-a to 3144-j-
Code of 1936, with particular reference to 3144-g.) Section 
3144-g provides for a levy upon all property subject to tax-
ation for local purposes for the purpose of raising the neces-
sary funds for setting up :firemen's relief under this provision 
of the code. 
It would appear that many of the objections which were 
made to the Acts of 1908 a.nd 1932 apply with equal pertinency 
in the case at bar . 
.A.fter all, what the Act purports to authorize and what the 
ordinance attempts to do is to levy a tax upon a very limited 
number of persons or corporations and to turn it over to an-
·-
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other very limited group for a benevolent or charitable pur-
pose. Jfor the payment of its obligations the city needs no 
legislative authority; for the maintenance of a :firemen's re-
lief certain legislation has been provided which may or may 
not be adopted by the cities; for such appropriations or for 
authority to make appropriations for charitable purposes 
S~ction 3034 of the Code provides it. I am of the opinion 
that when the General Assembly of Virginia .enacted Section 
3034 of the Code as Section 67 of the Constitution provided 
it might do, it did all that was necessary or proper to em-
power the cities, towns and counties to make appropriations 
of their public funds to charitable organizations; 
page 93 ~ and that when it (the Legislature) attempted to 
authorize the city to levy a tax to be collected 
and set apart for a special charitable purpose and no other,. 
it exceeded the authority granted in Section 67. I cannot 
but feel that the Legislature has gone farther in the enact-
ments set out above, than the last clause of Section 67 con-
templated, and that Sections 3144-t, et seq., the particular 
sections which provide for the collection and appropriation 
of such tax are unconstitutional. The Act being unconsti-
tutional, the ordinance is likewise so. The relief prayed for 
is denied, and the City is enjoined from collecting the tax. 
I do not consider it necessary to pass upon other questions 
raised as to the validity of the Act and Ordinance., 
A decree may be drawn in accordance with the above views. 
JOHN WEYMOUTH .. 
page 94 ~ The following is the notice of an application to 
the Clerk of this Court for a transcript of the 
Record in said case, in order to apply for au appeal. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County. 
City of Hampton, a Municipal Corporation of the State of 
Virginia, Complainant, 
v. 
Insurance Company of North America, a foreign Corporation, 
Defendant. 
City of Hampton; v. Insura.nce Co~ of North ~erica. ?~ 
NOTiGE: 
To: ,J. Gordon Bohannon. Esquire, .Attorney for the De: 
fendant. 
· Please. take notice. th;;it 9p the 6th day of March, 1940, .at 
10:00 o'clo_ck A~ M., the undersigned, by its counsel, will apply 
to · the Clerk of the Circuit Court of E_lizabeth City County, 
~this office in the City of Hampton~ ;\Tirginia; for a duly ce~-
tified copy of the record in the above styled suit, to be filed 
with a petition to be made on behalf of the. undersigned to · 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgip.ia .f.or 3::µ appeal from 
t:tie decree entered.by the Judge of the aforesaid Court on the 
10th day of November, 1939. 
CITY OF HAMPTON, A MUNICIPJ\:~ CORPORA~ 
TION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Com-
plainant. ~ 
by WALTER M. EVANS·, : 
Of Counsel. 
.. 
Legal &nd ~~mely ::service of the above not~ee! .is hereby ac- -
knowledged on the 24th day of February, 1940. 
page 95 ~ Virginia: 
J.,GQRDON Bp~4-NN.~N, 
Counsel for the Defendant. 
, In the -·Clerk's ·Office of the Circuit Court of Elizabeth 
City County, on the 6 day of March, 1940. 
' - . . 
I, R. E. ·Wilson, Clerk of the aforesaid Court, hereby cer-
tify that the foregoing is a transcript of the record in· the 
chancery ca.use of City of Hampton, a municipal corporation 
of the State of Virginia, Complainant, v. Insurance Company 
of North -America, a foreign corporation, defendant, lately 
pending in said Court : 
- · I furthe'r certify that the s·ame was not made up and com-
pleted ~nd delivered ·until the parties hereto had received 
due notice thereof and of the intention of the City of Hamp-
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ton, a municipal Corporation of the State of Virginia, to ap-
peal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia from the 
decree of said Court entered on the 10th day of November, 
1939. · 
Teste: 
R. E. WILSON, Clerk. 
By S. M. GIBSON, 
(Seal) 
• 
A Copy-Teste ·. 
Dep. Olk. 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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